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 In this dissertation, I offer three independent studies that each contribute to the literature on poverty 
and infant health. The first essay examines whether access to public transportation reduces food insecurity in 
the U.S. Potential endogeneity problem is addressed with instruments of federal transportation funding. I 
provide new evidence of a negative causal effect of public transportation accessibility on food insecurity, 
which is more prominent among poor African-American households. The second essay examines the relation 
between savings of poor households and a welfare program called the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance 
Program (SNAP). Eligibility for SNAP benefits requires households to own limited value of assets. Beginning 
in 2001, states were given the authority to formulate their own rules regarding how vehicles are counted 
towards this asset limit in the SNAP. Using the Survey of Income and Program Participation, the results 
suggest that liberalizing vehicle asset rules increases vehicle assets of households with a high ex ante 
probability of program participation. Particularly, this increase in car value can be attributed primarily to low 
educated single parents who already owned a car before the policy change buying more expensive cars. The 
third essay examines how notifications of governmental authorities mitigate the effect of air pollutants on 
infant health outcomes in Korea. Using a data set of 1.5 million babies, and air status information from 250 
weather stations in Korea between 2003 and 2011, the results indicate that the public warnings against the 








CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation consists of three essays that each contribute to the literature on poverty 
and infant health. In the second chapter, I examine whether access to public transportation reduces 
food insecurity in the U.S. In the third chapter, I analyze how poor households’ savings behavior 
is determined by the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program existing literature failed to 
examine.  In the fourth chapter, I investigate the impact of a government’s air quality notifications 
on infant health, using yellow sand storms as a natural experiment. 
1.1 The Effect of Public Transportation Accessibility on Food Insecurity 
I examine whether access to public transportation reduces the probability of food insecurity 
for households. The dataset combines information from the Current Population Survey Food 
Security Supplement and the National Transit Database from 2006 to 2009. I address a potential 
endogeneity problem using the changes in federal governmental transportation funding as 
instruments. I find evidence of a negative causal effect of public transportation accessibility on 
food insecurity. An extra bus-equivalent vehicle per 10,000 people decreases the probability of 
food insecurity of households by 1.6 percentage points. In particular, the impact of public transit 
is more prominent among poor households and poor African-American households. 
1.2 The Impact of SNAP Vehicle Asset Limits on Asset Allocation in Low-Income Households 
The Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program is a means-tested income transfer 
program, and eligibility for program benefits requires that households own less than a threshold 
value in assets. Beginning in 2001, states were given the authority to formulate their own rules 
regarding how vehicles are counted towards this asset limit. I use data for single parents with low 
education from the Survey of Income and Program Participation to examine the effects of state 




non-housing wealth. I estimate the effects of state vehicle asset rules using a difference-in-
differences specification, as well as a household fixed effects specification that tracks households 
over time. I exploit within-household differences in timing of the state vehicle asset policy changes 
to identify the effect of state vehicle asset rules on the outcomes of interest.  Results show that 
liberalizing vehicle asset rules increases vehicle assets of households with a high ex ante 
probability of program participation. After vehicle asset rules are relaxed, households own cars 
that are worth $2,000 more compared to before the policy change, and they take on more debt in 
order to finance their vehicles. I find that this increase in car value can be attributed primarily to 
low educated single parents who already owned a car before the policy change buying more 
expensive cars. Liberalizing vehicle asset rules has no impact on liquid asset holdings and no 
impact on non-housing wealth. 
1.3 The Impact of Air Quality Notifications on Infant Health: Evidence from Korea 
Naturally-occurring yellow sand outbreaks worsen air quality in Korea. To warn Koreans 
about these dust storms, Korean Meteorological Administration issues public notifications, and 
advise individuals to take protective action. Using a data set of about 1.5 million Korean babies 
born between 2003 and 2011, I investigate the impact of these dust warnings on birth outcomes. 
Identification of the effect of the warnings comes from the exogenous yellow sand outbreaks that 
are caused by winds that carry dust particles from China and Mongolia to Korea. My results 
indicate that the public warnings against the yellow sand events improve birth outcomes. Back of 
the envelope calculations suggest that the present value of the net benefit of each public dust 






CHAPTER 2. THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION ACCESSIBILITY 
ON FOOD INSECURITY * 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In February 1994, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), in conjunction with the 
Census Bureau, created measures of food security at the household level to gauge food 
accessibility. Food insecurity is important as a direct measure of material hardship, such as food 
and clothing insufficiency (Mayer and Jencks 1989).1 Food security status is measured through a 
survey using a nationally representative sample of households. Heads of these households have 
responded to 18 questions regarding their year-long ability to obtain food. Households are defined 
as food insecure if they are unable to acquire adequate food at times during the year due to the lack 
of money or other resources.2 Households’ food insecurity rate decreased to a minimum of 10.1 
percent in 1999, implying that 10.5 million households suffered from food insecurity, and then it 
went up to a maximum of 14.7 percent (17.4 million households) in 2009. The rate was 14.9 
percent in 2011 (USDA, Economic Research Service (ERS), 2012). In response to a large increase 
in food-insecure households and evidence of its negative health consequences,3 economists have 
become interested in analyzing the determinants of food insecurity (Gundersen et al. 2011a).  
                                                          
* This Chapter is a pre-print of an article forthcoming in the Eastern Economic Journal.  
 
1 Mayer and Jencks (1989) documented that food insecurity is a better measure for material hardship than income 
level or official poverty rate. Nutritional outcomes may be used as an alternative to food insecurity, however I focus 
on the latter because of data availability. Specifically, I explain below, to match my interesting variable, public 
transportation data, to the outcome variable, residence information is necessary, but it is not available in nutrition data 
source such as the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey. 
2 Note that food insecurity is not a measure of an amount of calories for surviving but a measure of subjective 
satisfaction. See Cafiero (2013) for more explanations about food insecurity. 
3 Bhattacharya et al. (2004) found a significantly negative impact of food insecurity on nutritional outcomes among 
adults and the elderly. Cook et al. (2004) suggested that food insecurity of households is associated with poor health 




A number of studies have investigated the impact on food insecurity of such factors as 
welfare benefits (Gundersen et al. 2012; 2011b; Mykerezi and Mills 2010; Gundersen and Kreider 
2008; Wilde and Nord 2005; Borjas 2004; Gundersen and Oliveira 2001), homelessness 
(Gundersen et al. 2003), and household-income levels (Leete and Bania 2010; Ribar and Hamrick 
2003). Beaulieu (2007) noted that, in addition to socioeconomic factors, access to food also 
depends on local conditions such as public transportation, proximity to retail grocery stores, as 
well as the price of food. The availability of local public transportation is expected to influence 
access to food stores. As described in Blanchard and Lyson (2006; 2002), households without cars, 
by necessity, must use public transportation if grocery stores are not located within walking 
distance. If public transportation is not available or readily accessible, then households without 
cars may go grocery shopping less frequently and just use close convenience stores to buy snack 
food; people in those households are more likely to report being food insecure, since they cannot 
access balanced meals (Cafiero 2013). Limited access to public transportation may lead to another 
unfavorable consequence; households without cars necessarily spend more time and money to 
travel to grocery stores. Higher costs may cut the size of meals, increasing food insecurity. 
A lack of public transportation matters, particularly to the poor, since they are less likely 
to own cars. Those who can afford to procure and maintain an automobile will have a greater 
chance of not running short on money for food. Further, even if some poor people have food stamp 
vouchers or money for food, they may not be able to spend the vouchers or money unless grocery 
stores are located in an area accessible without vehicles. U.S. Department of Transportation 
(USDT) stated that in 2001, the proportion of households without vehicles was around 10 times 
higher for households with incomes less than $25,000 (20.3 percent) compared with those with 




households without access to automobiles are “disproportionately poor and minority.” 4  The 
authors addressed that disparity in car ownership is considerably noticeable depending on income 
level as well as race. In particular, even among the poor, African-Americans are less likely than 
whites to own automobiles.   
In a similar vein, it is shown that the food insecurity rate is more prevalent among the poor, 
compared to non-poor households. In 2010, the rate among low-income households, defined as 
households with income below 185% of the federal poverty level, was about 33 percent, more than 
two times the national level. Those poor households accounted for roughly 60 percent of U.S. food 
insecure households. There is also a white-black difference in food insecurity rates; the rate is 
higher for those who are black (25.1 percent) versus those who are white (10.8 percent).  
In short, vehicle ownership is strongly associated with income level of a household, and, 
in turn, income level determines food hardships of a household. Poor households tend to have 
lower car ownership and higher food insecurity rates compared to non-poor households. 
Furthermore, the propensity for not owning an automobile as well as of being food insecure is 
more prominent for the black poor than the white poor. In this paper, I document the role of public 
transportation accessibility on food insecurity for households. I also examine whether the effect of 
access to public transit differs by income level and race.  
This study presents the first empirical analysis of the impact of public transportation on 
food insecurity. I use the number of vehicles operated in urbanized areas (UA) from the National 
Transit Database (NTD) and household food insecurity data from the Current Population Survey 
                                                          
4 Using the 2000 five percent Public Use Microdata Sample of the U.S. Census of Population and Housing, the authors 
showed that around 12 percent of the white poor, defined as people in households with income less than 100 percent 
of the federal poverty level, had no automobiles, while 33 percent of the black poor did not own automobiles. Among 
near poor individuals, those in households with income-to-poverty ratios between 100 and 200 percent of the federal 
poverty line, the black-white gap in car ownership was 12 percentage points (21 percent of blacks, compared with 9 




Food Security Supplement (CPS-FSS) from 2006 to 2009. The data on public transportation at the 
UA level are linked to the data on food insecurity for households living in a Metropolitan Statistical 
Area (MSA). I define the matched area between a UA and an MSA as a local area.  
It is, however, hard to identify the effect of public transportation at the local area level on 
food insecurity because of potential endogeneity. Unobservable public welfare interests of a local 
government could be correlated with both public transportation accessibility and food insecurity. 
For example, if a local government is interested in the welfare of the residents, then it may invest 
more in public transportation system. Similarly, local poverty rates may impact food insecurity 
through lack of income and lack of car ownership. Local poverty may also be correlated with 
public transportation accessibility and failure to control for it may result in biased estimates. 
Without a control for the variation in welfare interests across local governments, the estimated 
effect of transit vehicles on food insecurity will be biased. I address this empirical difficulty using 
the Urbanized Area Formula (UAF) Grants,5 which are federal transit funds at the UA level, as 
instruments for public transportation. As I discuss below, the decision on the amount of the UAF 
funds from the federal government does not depend on a local area’s welfare interests. Thus, the 
federal transit subsidies are expected to have an influence on the number of public transit vehicles 
but should have no direct impact on a household’s food insecurity. 
There are two types of grants associated with public transportation: 1) formula grants, and 
2) discretionary grants. The UAF grants, one of the formula grants, can be justified as viable 
instruments because the amount of funds is decided solely by the federal government.6 The federal 
government calculates the amount of the UAF funds based on several factors such as population, 
                                                          
5 The federal government has subsidized the UAF grants to urbanized areas since the fiscal year 1984, after the 
establishment of the Surface Transportation Act of 1982. 
6 I do not use the other formula grants because they are designed for special purposes such as aids for job access, 




population density and transit mileage released by the NTD two years ago.7 8 One may doubt the 
validity of the instrument arguing the possibility that more transit vehicles lead to a higher 
allocation of federal grants. According to the formula above, the amount of the UAF grants is 
determined based on the past demographic and transit data of a local area. Thus, there may not 
exist the problem of reverse causality even with the contemporary grants. 
I find that accessibility of public transportation, measured by the number of bus-equivalent 
vehicles operated in a UA, has a significantly negative effect on food insecurity of a household. 
One additional bus-equivalent vehicle per 10,000 people decreases the probability of food 
insecurity of households by 1.6 percentage points. The estimated results indicate that the effect of 
public transportation on food insecurity is statistically significant for poor households, those 
earning less than 185% of the federal poverty line, and all households. In particular, the 
relationship is more conspicuous among low-income households, compared to all households. 
These findings imply that the overall effect on food insecurity from public transportation in the 
sample of all households stems from the high impact present in the sample of poor households. 
Furthermore, I find a strong effect of transportation accessibility among the poor African-
American households, not among the poor white households. Results are robust to using different 
measures of public transportation accessibility as well as various measures of food insecurity. 
Overall, this paper suggests that public transit vehicles may be an important determinant of food 
insecurity of households, particularly for the poor Black households.  
                                                          
7 See FTA Apportionments, Allocations, and Program Information of each fiscal year for more information. 
8 In contrast, local governments participate in the decision on the amount of discretionary grants. Therefore, those 
discretionary funds might be endogenous because local areas take into account their own transportation systems in 




The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2, I provide a literature review. 
Section 2.3 presents an empirical specification, and section 2.4 describes data construction. The 
estimated results are in section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes the paper.    
2.2 Literature review 
Of previous literature studying the role of public transportation, a study by Glaeser et al. 
(2008) is the most relevant to this paper. Using decennial Census-tract level data (1980, 1990, and 
2000), they examined whether access to public transportation causes the poor to have a higher 
propensity to reside in central cities. Unlike this paper, where I use food insecurity at the household 
level as a dependent variable, they used measures of poverty such as poverty rates and household 
median income at the tract level. 9  Glaeser and his colleagues measured access to public 
transportation with proximity to a rail transit from a census tract, while I use the number of bus 
equivalent vehicles actually operated in a local area. The authors considered endogeneity of transit 
access because public transportation may be built or expanded to support the poor. In order to 
account for such possible empirical issues, they limited the sample to 16 cities and peripheral 
districts of New York City where no public transportation systems were added for the convenience 
of the poor. They concluded that a higher density of poor populations in central cities is attributable 
to proximity to public transportation.  
Contrary to a few economic studies on public transportation, there has been a large 
literature examining the factors that determine food insecurity. The majority of studies that 
analyzed the determinants of the increase in food insecurity since the recession in 2001 have 
focused on the impact of food assistance programs. Some studies have found that food welfare 
                                                          
9  As pointed earlier, Mayer and Jencks (1989) argued that poverty rates do not measure material deprivation 




programs decrease the probability of being food insecure, (Gundersen et al. 2012; Mykerezi and 
Mills 2010; Borjas 2004), while others found no causal effect of the Food Stamp Program (FSP, 
renamed Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program or SNAP as of October 2008)10 (Gundersen 
and Oliveira 2001) or even a positive association of food stamp participation on food insecurity 
(Wilde and Nord 2005). The debate over the impact of food assistance programs on food insecurity 
has arisen due to various empirical problems. The choice of receiving welfare benefits may be 
correlated with unobserved factors (Gundersen et al. 2012; Mykerezi and Mills 2010; Wilde and 
Nord 2005; Borjas 2004; Gundersen and Oliveira 2001).11 The possibility of misreporting food 
insecurity status and food assistance participation could also be an obstacle for identification of 
the effect of FSP on food insecurity (Gundersen et al. 2012; Gundersen and Kreider 2008).  
Some studies have focused on food insecurity status of minority households such as 
homeless female-headed households, American Indians, or immigrants, since those households’ 
food insecurity rate tends to be higher. Gundersen et al. (2003) analyzed the relationship between 
homelessness and food insecurity for female-headed families in Worcester, Massachusetts, from 
August 1992 to July 1995. To account for selection, they compiled information of homeless 
female-headed households and female-headed low-income households residing in houses. They 
found evidence that families with higher risk of homelessness are more likely to have higher levels 
of food insecurity. Food insecurity for American Indians was discussed by Gundersen (2008). The 
article described that food insecurity levels are higher for American Indians than for non-American 
                                                          
10 This paper uses the FSP rather than SNAP for the program name because the former has been used for the majority 
of my sample period.   
11 Gundersen and Oliveira (2001) and Mykerezi and Mills (2010) used a simultaneous equation model with a measure 
of food insufficiency from the Survey of Income and Program Participants (SIPP) and a food insecurity measure from 
the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, respectively. Gundersen et al. (2012) employed non-parametric method using 




Indians, holding everything else constant. Using three different measures of food insecurity,12 the 
author suggested that the significance of level differences between American Indians and non-
American Indians differs depending on measures of food insecurity. Borjas (2004) took notice of 
a steep reduction in food insecurity rate among immigrants, compared to natives between 1994 
and 1998, although the policy change of Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation (PRWOR) Act of 1996 has imposed more restriction on the eligibility of 
immigrants to receive food assistance. With the data of CPS-FSS, Borjas (2004) used the variation 
across states in the aids to immigrants along with the national experiment of the policy change of 
the PRWOR and found that a reduction in public assistance leads to an increase in the probability 
of having food insecurity of households.  
2.3 Empirical strategy 
2.3.1 Empirical specification 
Consider a linear probability model of the equation (2.1) below. 
(2.1)  𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑃𝑇𝑚𝑡 + 𝑌𝑚𝑡
′ 𝛾 + 𝑋𝑖𝑚𝑡
′ Ω + 𝑍𝑠𝑡
′ Ψ + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑖𝑚𝑡 
where 𝑖 indicates a household, 𝑚 is a local area, 𝑠 stands for a state, and 𝑡 is an interview year. 
The outcome variable, 𝐹𝐼, is represented by the binary indicator of food insecurity status of each 
household; the creation of 𝐹𝐼 is explained in the data section. 𝑃𝑇 stands for public transportation 
accessibility, measured by the number of bus-equivalent vehicles such as subways, light rails, etc. 
per 10,000 people in a local area in year 𝑡: I discuss this variable in more detail below. 𝑌 represents 
a vector of annual unemployment rate and population in a local area. The local unemployment rate 
is used as a proxy for local labor market conditions. 𝑋  is a vector of family characteristics: 
                                                          
12 Three measures are the food insecurity rate, the food insecurity gap, and the square of food insecurity gap. The food 
insecurity gap is the difference between a Rasch scaling score and the assigned cutoff. I explain the Rasch scaling 




information of whether a household received food stamp benefits, poverty status, household 
structure, the number of employed individuals, the elderly, and children in a household, family 
income, and home ownership. As discussed in previous studies, the FSP is designed to help low-
income households obtain food. Therefore, food insecurity may be affected by food stamp receipts 
at the household level. To control for the possible effect of the program, food stamp participation 
at the household level is included in this specification.13 X also contains attributes of the household 
head: education level, race, Hispanic ethnicity, gender, marital status, and age dummies. As 
proxies for the extent to which state governments are interested in public welfare, I also use a state-
level government’s generosity measure (public welfare expenditures) and an indicator of poverty 
by state (food stamp participation rate or takeup rate), and they are denoted by 𝑍. The former one 
is calculated by taking logarithm of public welfare expenditures in $1,000 in each state. The latter 
is measured by dividing the number of people participating in the FSP by the FSP-eligible people 
in a state.14  
The specification contains state dummies15 and year dummies as fixed effects, 𝜇𝑠 and 𝜆𝑡, 
respectively, to control for heterogeneity across states and time. Instead of local fixed effects, I use 
state fixed effects because local areas within the same state tend to have similar aspects such as 
quality of roads, weather, etc. which are omitted. To adjust for possible correlation of errors 
                                                          
13 As discussed in many studies (Gundersen, Kreider, and Pepper 2012; 2011a; 2011b, Mykerezi and Mills 2010, 
Gundersen and Kreider 2008, Wilde and Nord 2005, Borjas 2004, Gundersen and Oliveira 2001), a food stamp 
variable is likely to be endogenous. Thus, the coefficient of food stamp participation in this paper does not provide a 
meaningful interpretation, but it is a control variable. 
14 If a state is more interested in providing welfare aid, it is likely to have less strict program rules and have broad 
outreach to inform potentially eligible persons of such welfare programs. Then, the food stamp participation rate in 
the state will be higher (Bitler, Currie and Scholz 2003). 




between the households within the same state, standard errors are clustered at the state level.16  
represents an idiosyncratic error term.  
2.3.2 Endogeneity concerns 
The link between public transportation accessibility and food insecurity may be difficult to 
identify because of unobserved factors such as public welfare interests of a local government. 
Public welfare interests may be different between a local and a state government. Even after 
controlling for the state government’s generosity, local public transportation accessibility may be 
driven by a local government’s interests in the well-being of the poor. Even if one controls for 
local political inclination (e.g. by including a mayor’s party affiliation in a regression),17 there can 
still be unobservables at the local level that are correlated with public transportation accessibility 
and food insecurity. In other words, unobserved factors may not be fully captured by local political 
tendencies, and so a potential endogeneity issue still exists.  
To overcome this problem, I instrument for the number of bus-equivalent vehicles with 
public transit funds received from the federal government using the Urbanized Area Formula (UAF) 
Grants. This UAF Program (Section 5307, 49 U.S.C. Chapter 53) provides financial assistance 
annually to urbanized areas in forms of transportation capital and operating assistance.18 Unlike 
discretionary grants for which urbanized areas request necessary amounts evaluated and granted 
by the federal government, the decision process for the UAF funding involves only the federal 
government. In particular, the federal government assigns the amount based on population and 
                                                          
16  I also employ clustering at the local area level. Following Wooldridge (2010), moreover, I calculate robust 
(heteroskedasticity-corrected) standard errors since the number of clusters at the state or local area level may be not 
sufficient enough. The conclusion reported below is not substantially different from results with the standard errors 
computed differently. 
17 Using “percent of votes cast for Democrat in 2000,” Taylor et al. (2009) demonstrated that a local area with more 
voters favorable to Democratic likely has higher levels of public transit supply. 
18  The capital funding is spent on vehicle-related activities such as new vehicles, replacement of vehicles and 




population density for the areas between 50,000 and 200,000 residents. For areas with a population 
of 200,000 or more, the formula is based on “a combination of bus revenue vehicle miles, bus 
passenger miles, fixed guideway revenue vehicle miles, and fixed guideway route miles” in 
addition to population and population density. These six factors are an exhaustive list of the criteria 
that are used to compute the amount of UAF grants. 
One requirement for the validity of instruments is their independence from the outcome 
variable. UAF grants cannot be valid as instrumental variables if any criterion for UAF allocations 
is also related to the variation in food insecurity. I provide a detailed discussion below on whether 
and how each of these criteria might be related to food insecurity.  
First, in order to control for a potential relationship between population and food insecurity, 
I consider a measure of population at the local area in all my analyses. Second, population density 
can be used an additional control variable because an area with a higher population density may 
be home to a greater number of people facing food insecurity. Unfortunately, data on population 
density are not published every year. Alternatively, I address this problem by including yearly and 
local area fixed effects in additional regressions19 and find that the effect of public transportation 
on food insecurity is robust. Finally, it is difficult to believe that public transit services, which are 
measured as bus revenue vehicle miles, bus passenger miles, fixed guideway revenue vehicle miles, 
and fixed guideway route miles, are purposely scheduled to decrease food insecurity. However, 
more frequent services may be arranged in the areas with more expected passengers including the 
poor, and those areas likely have higher food insecurity rate. In order to address this possible 
problem, I include the unemployment rate at the local area level in the regressions of food 
                                                          




insecurity to control for local variation in economic conditions, which is a reasonable proxy for 
poverty status, in addition to time fixed-effects as well as state characteristics. 
The possibility of reverse causality from the number of transit vehicles operated to higher 
allocation of the federal funds is also arguably possible. However, the amount of the UAF funds 
is computed based on demographic and transit mileage data released by NTD two years ago. For 
example, in order to determine the UAF grants for the fiscal year 2009, the federal government 
examines those factors from 2007. Hence, reverse causality may not be problematic between the 
current number of public vehicles and the current UAF grants. Instead of using the current grants, 
however, I use the past grants as instruments because it takes years for the grants to be actually 
spent for vehicle-related activities. 20 
The UAF grants from the federal government must be spent within four years including 
the appropriation year. For example, the UAF grants for the 2012 fiscal year have been debated by 
Congress since October 1, 2011; then the amount was finalized into law after President Obama 
signed on July 6, 2012; on July 18, 2012, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) of the U.S. 
Department of Transportation officially published the dollar amount of FY 2012 funds. Then, 
grantees, or the transit agencies in an urbanized area, started to commence their projects. For 
instance, if a grantee places an order for a bus, it may take two years for the bus to be delivered.21 
In short, a local area should use up the FY 2012 UAF grants through the FY 2015, but will not be 
able to spend the grants of the FY 2012 during the 2012 fiscal year or the appropriation year. 
Hence, I include the past UAF federal grants as instruments, not the grants in the appropriation 
                                                          
20 The reverse causality issue may still be a concern if the variation in the local public transportation usage shows 
persistent dynamics over time. To test the existence of reverse causality, I use future years’ federal grants as 
instruments instead as opposed to previous years and find that future grants, unlike previous years, are weak 
instruments with F-values of 7.7. 




year. Since there is no information on how the formula amount is actually allocated across four 
fiscal years, the instruments for the number of bus-equivalent vehicles in the current year are the 
last three years’ UAF grants whose usage started one, two, and three years ago. For instance, the 
UAF grants of the FY 2006, 2007, and 2008 are used as instruments for the number of bus-
equivalent vehicles operated in the FY 2009.  
One could also be concerned about the variation in the instruments, whether the amount of 
UAF grants varies enough to capture the change in the number of transit vehicles between UAs 
and across time. As I explain above, since the population size, for example, is considered for the 
computation of the apportioned amount, the FTA has calculated dollar unit value, the amount of 
dollars legally assigned to one person. The dollar unit value of each factor such as population, 
population density, etc. varies among areas with different population size and across years. For 
example, the dollar unit value to one person in urbanized areas over 1,000,000 people was 
calculated as $3.259 in the fiscal year 2008, but $1.398 in 2009 (USDT 2008; 2009).22  For 
urbanized areas with fewer than 1,000,000 people, it was $2.986 in 2008 and $1.282 in 2009.  
In summary, to account for a potential endogeneity problem, I use the federal government 
subsidies, more precisely UAF grants in the past, as instruments for the number of bus-equivalent 
vehicles. The change in the UAF grants for public transportation is related to the number of 




                                                          






2.4.1 Food insecurity 
Since 1995, the Current Population Survey Food Security Supplement (CPS-FSS) has 
collected information related to food-related needs from a nationally representative sample of 
about 50,000 households once a year. Households are interviewed for two years in a row and then 
dropped from the sample. More specifically, in any given year, half of the sample consists of 
households who were surveyed in the previous year and the remaining half consists of newcomers. 
Interviews are conducted in-person or by telephone with a “knowledgeable household member” 
in each household. Therefore, food insecurity status is recorded at the household level.  
Following Gundersen (2008), I employ cross-sectional analysis by constructing the dataset 
where each household appears only once. Since each household was surveyed for two consecutive 
years, I select households interviewed the second time from 2006 through 2008 and all households 
interviewed in 2009. I accept Gundersen’s approach rather than a panel approach because there is 
little variation across two successive years in the number of family members, income level, and 
education level for each household head.23 
The measure of food insecurity is based on 18 questions about food hardships in the past 
twelve months if the household has children, or 10 questions for households without children: the 
full set of 18 questions is available in Appendix A. These questions determine “if the household 
cut the size of meals, skipped meals or was hungry, but didn’t eat because it couldn’t afford enough 
food.” The CPS-FSS states that one single question may not measure food insecurity status 
properly, but the combination of 18 or 10 questions should be considered to provide “more reliable 
                                                          
23 Given that only half of the households in the sample are replaced every year, the households are allowed to appear 





measure of food insecurity.” To classify 18 or 10 questions into food insecurity categories, the 
USDA has implemented the Rasch scaling method, 24 which assigns a value to each affirmative 
response to 18 or 10 food insecurity questions and determines thresholds to define food security, 
low food security or very low food security conditions.25 More specifically, households, regardless 
of having children, are classified to be food secure if they report at most two positive responses to 
food insecurity conditions.26 Households with children are low food secure if they report at least 
three, but fewer than eight food insecurity conditions, while households without children are low 
food secure if they report three to five food insecurity conditions. Households with children who 
report eight or more food insecurity conditions are classified as having very low food security, 
whereas households without children are reported very low food security with at least six food 
insecurity conditions. Following most of the previous literature (e.g., Borjas 2004), food insecurity 
is defined to be 1 if a household is low food secure or very low food secure, or 0 if food secure. 
Figures 2.1 displays the distributions of a set of cumulative responses to food insecurity 
questions for households. Figure 2.1.,A. is for households with children, and the possible number 
of affirmative responses varies from 0 to 18. Figure 2.1.,B. is for households without children with 
a range of index from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 10. These two figures show almost the 
same pattern: the percent of households accounting for the number of affirmative answers is 
comparable in both figures. The majority of the two groups answered zeros: the proportion of food-
secure households with children is about 80 percent (Figure 2.1.,A.), and it is the same for 
                                                          
24 Assessment variables such as abilities are available from survey responses, but it is hard for those variables to be 
recoded into a binary measure. The Rasch model is designed to provide a criterion to create a dichotomous measure. 
See Andrich (1988) for more information on the Rasch scale model. 
25 A one-to-one match between Rasch scale scores and the number of affirmative responses to food questions was 
presented in Table 10 of Gundersen (2008). The labels “low food security” and “very low food security” started to be 
used since 2005, which correspond to “food insecurity without hunger” and “food insecurity with hunger,” 
respectively, before 2005. 
26 Positive responses to food insecurity conditions are “often”, “sometimes”, “almost every month,” “some months 




households without children (Figure 2.1.,B.). Both groups answered a one survey question 
affirmatively at a rate of about 5 percent. About 0.7 percent of households with children responded 
affirmatively to more than 10 food insecurity questions (Figure 2.1.A.).  
           
                 A. Households with children            B. Households without children 
 
Note: X-axis refers to the number of affirmative responses to food insecurity questions and y-axis is percent 
of households. 
 Figure 2.1 Food insecurity responses for households  
 
Following Rasch scale scores, two affirmative responses are applied as a threshold to 
identify food insecurity status. As robustness checks, I also use alternative cutoffs such as three, 
four, five and six.27 For example, a household with or without children is classified as food 
insecure if that household reports at least four food insecure conditions. However, the dichotomous 
measure does not fully reflect the different degrees of severity in food security/insecurity condition. 
A zero response implies a fully food secure condition, while 18 indicates the most severe condition 
of food insecurity. Three affirmative responses indicate far less severe condition of food insecurity 
than 18 affirmative answers, but both are deemed food insecure when two positive responses are 
used as a cutoff of being food secure. Therefore, to account for an actual, distinct severity level of 
                                                          




food insecurity, I also apply categorical measures of food insecurity.28 The range of this measure 
for households with children is 0 to 18 and it is 0 to 10 for households without children. 
Food insecurity condition of a household depends on its income level, which is highly 
associated with car ownership. I expect the effects of public transportation on food insecurity to 
be different between poor households and non-poor households because of a number of reasons, 
the primary one being that lack of public transportation should be more of a constraint for poor 
households as they are less likely to own a car; I provide this discussion in the results section. In 
this paper, I conduct my analyses by households’ poverty level.  
Table 2.1 lists summary statistics of the variables at the household level for the three 
samples from 2006 to 2009: the first one is for all households; the second one is for poor 
households, defined as households with income less than 185% of federal poverty level; the third 
one is for non-poor households, defined as households earning more than or equal to 185% of the 
federal poverty line. Similar to the national poverty ratio,29 poor households in this paper account 
for 31 percent of the entire sample. In the sample of poor households, 30 percent of households 
were food insecure, which is, not surprisingly, more than two times higher than the proportion of 
food insecure households (13 percent) in the entire sample. Only 6 percent of non-poor households 
were reported being food insecure.  
 
                                                          
28 Bickel et al. (2000) also pointed out that categorical 0 to18 and 0 to10 scale measures would be more appropriate. 
For example, a study by Howard (2011) employed a food insecurity scale measure between 0 and 18 for his analysis. 
29 U.S. Census Bureau presented that roughly 30% of households have their incomes less than 185% of the federal 
poverty threshold for the period of 2006 to 2009. Poverty ratios employed by specified ratios of poverty thresholds 












Variable Definition Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
  Food insecurity = 1 if a household was food insecure,  
   0 otherwise 
0.13 0.34 0.30 0.46 0.06 0.23 
        
Household variables        
  Poor =1 if household income was below 185% of federal  
   poverty level 
0.31 0.46     
  FSP beneficiary  =1 if household received food stamp program (FSP)  
   benefits, 0 otherwise 
0.07 0.26 0.22 0.41 0.01 0.08 
No. of employed  
  individuals 
Total number of employed individuals in family 1.26 0.92 0.90 0.93 1.42 0.87 
  No. of elders Total number of elders in family 0.27 0.57 0.33 0.59 0.25 0.56 
  No. of children Total number of children in family 0.67 1.07 0.92 1.30 0.55 0.92 
Single 
  female-headed HH   
= 1 if household was single female-headed family,  
   0 otherwise 
0.05 0.21 0.10 0.30 0.02 0.15 
  Low income = 1 if annual family Income was less than $35,000,  
   0 otherwise 
0.34 0.47 0.88 0.32 0.10 0.30 
  Middle income = 1 if annual family Income was between $35,000 and  
   $75,000, 0 otherwise  
0.32 0.47 0.11 0.32 0.42 0.49 
  High income = 1 if annual family Income was greater than or equal  
   to $75,000, 0 otherwise  
0.33 0.47 0.00 0.03 0.49 0.50 
  Home ownership = 1 if household owned a house, 0 otherwise 0.63 0.48 0.39 0.49 0.74 0.44 
        
Household head variables       
Less than  
  high school 
= 1 if a household head had less than high-school  
   degree, 0 otherwise 
0.11 0.32 0.27 0.44 0.04 0.20 
  High school = 1 if a household head had high-school degree,  
   0 otherwise 
0.23 0.42 0.32 0.47 0.19 0.39 
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Table 2.1 continued  
  Less than college = 1 if a household head had less than college degree,  
   0 otherwise 
0.27 0.45 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.45 
  College  = 1 if a household head had at least college degree,  
   0 otherwise 
0.38 0.49 0.14 0.35 0.49 0.50 
  White = 1 if a household head is white, 0 otherwise  0.78 0.41 0.70 0.46 0.82 0.39 
  Black  = 1 if a household head is black, 0 otherwise  0.14 0.35 0.22 0.41 0.10 0.31 
  Other race = 1 if a household head is other race, such as Asian,  
   other than white or black, 0 otherwise 
0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 
  Hispanic = 1 if a household head is Hispanic, 0 otherwise 0.17 0.37 0.30 0.46 0.11 0.31 
  Female = 1 if a household head is female, 0 otherwise 0.49 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.45 0.50 
  Married = 1if a household head was married, 0 otherwise 0.51 0.50 0.37 0.48 0.58 0.49 
  30 year younger = 1 if a household head was younger than 30 years  
   old, 0 otherwise 
0.14 0.35 0.20 0.40 0.12 0.32 
  30-39 year old = 1 if a household head was between 30 and 40  
   years old, 0 otherwise 
0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 
  40-49 year old = 1 if a household head was between 40 and 50  
   years old, 0 otherwise 
0.22 0.41 0.18 0.39 0.24 0.43 
  50-59 year old = 1 if a household head was between 50 and 60  
   years old, 0 otherwise 
0.19 0.39 0.15 0.35 0.21 0.41 
60 year old  
  and older 
= 1 if a household head was older than or equal to 60  
   years old, 0 otherwise 
0.25 0.43 0.28 0.45 0.23 0.42 
N  28,304 8,418 19,886 
Notes: a: The sample of poor households is the subsample for households with income less than 185% of federal poverty level. b: Non-poor 
households are classified as households earnings equal to or greater than 185% of the federal poverty line. 







There exist differences between poor and non-poor households. Some variables such as the 
proportion of food stamp beneficiaries,30 31 and the number of elders and children in a family have 
higher mean values for the poor households’ sample than for the non-poor households’ sample. In 
contrast, some family and household head characteristics such as the number of employed 
individuals in a household and college education level of household head have higher mean values 
in the sample of non-poor households than the poor households. The CPS reports a household’s 
income as a range, not a continuous variable. I classify households into three categories. 
Households with income less than $35,000 are categorized as low income, less than $75,000 as 
middle income, and equal to or greater than $75,000 as high income group. These three groups of 
households, respectively, account for 34, 32, and 33 percent of the entire households. As expected, 
the majority of the poor households consist of low income households (88 percent), while middle 
and high income groups account for about 90 percent of non-poor households.32 
I also construct two subsamples regarding race in low-income households: poor African-
American and poor white households.33 The number of observations of blacks and whites among 
                                                          
30 The USDA screens out respondents based on the question whether a household received FSP benefits. Specifically, 
if income level of a household was not below 185 percent poverty level and simultaneously “the household never ran 
short of money and tried to make food or food money go further in the past 12 month,” then the question related to 
FSP was not asked. Therefore, I assign those households who were screened out to no-beneficiaries of FSP. 
31 About 7% of households in the entire sample were food stamp beneficiaries. This food stamp program (FSP) 
prevalence rate is lower than national level rate that was on average about 10% during the same period. This is 
presumably because the food insecurity rate and FSP prevalence rate are systemically associated and my sample does 
not contain some urbanized areas with higher food insecurity rate due to transportation data availability, which is 
discussed in next section below. 
32 In the sample of poor households, there are 11 households belonging to high income category. It is assured because 
the total number of family members in those households is large between 8 and 12. Of 1,095 non-poor but food 
insecure households, 190 households were in the high income group. There could be two explanations for that. Higher 
number of family members in the household could be one reason. The second could be that all of those households 
resided in large metropolitan areas such as Atlanta, New York, Seattle, San Diego, Los Angeles, Washington D.C, etc. 
Due to higher living costs, they might respond being food insecure. Note that responses to food insecurity questions 
are subjective, not objective, and involve satisfaction for food. 
33 I do not report summary statistics for poor African-Americans and for poor whites, but they are available on request. 




the poor is 1,852 and 5,958, respectively.34 The black-white difference in food insecurity rates 
among poor households is over 10 percentage points (39 percent for blacks and 28 percent for 
whites).  
2.4.2 Transportation data 
Annual transit data from 2006 to 2009 are obtained from the National Transit Database 
(NTD).35 Similar to Taylor et al. (2009), I analyze the public transit system at the urbanized area 
(UA) level. Transit agencies, which are transit providers that receive Urbanized Area Formula 
(UAF) Grants from the Federal Transit Administration, are required to compile and submit data to 
the NTD. The NTD provides the count of vehicles (cars)36 that are available to the general public 
and actually operated on a peak day,37 which is annually reported by transportation mode (such as 
a bus for carrying transit passengers). I focus on bus, vanpool,38 subway (heavy rail), light rail, and 
trolleybus among 15 modes of transportation, since the others are not suitable for food 
acquisition.39 For example, it is hard to imagine people who use ferryboats or commuter rails for 
their daily grocery shopping. Buses and vanpools account for about 90 percent of the number of 
public transit vehicles operated.  
                                                          
34 In this sample, the number of the white poor is three times larger than that of the black poor, which is similar to the 
entire U.S. population. 
35 The NTD reports annual data over a 12-month fiscal year. Data are available at the Annual Databases:  
http://www.ntdprogram.gov/ntdprogram/data.htm 
36 For example, a survey (a long train) consists of, on an average, six to eight cars, whereas a light rail (a short train) 
constitutes of one to four cars. 
37 According to the NTD, vehicles operated in abnormal days or one-time special events are excluded. 
38 Vanpool (also known as “Demand response”) is defined as “a transit mode comprised of vans or small buses 
operating as a ride sharing arrangement, providing transportation to a group of individuals traveling directly between 
their homes and a regular destination within the same geographical area.” 
39 I exclude automated guide way, commuter rail, ferryboat, inclined plane, monorail, and publico, but inclusion of 
those types of public transportation is not sensitive to estimates. According to the NTD, a cable car has been only 
operated in San Francisco which is not in my sample, and jitney (a type of bus) is not also considered in the data set 
because the only one transit agency in California provided the service until 2005. Similarly, Alaska railroad is excluded 
from transportation modes because Alaska is not in my sample. 
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The number of public vehicles operated in a UA is standardized in terms of bus units and 
used as a proxy for accessibility of public transportation. A capacity of a vehicle varies by each 
mode of transportation. For example, a bus is not comparable to a subway car/vehicle. According 
to the 2010 Conditions and Performance Report, a bus, a subway car, and a light rail car has on 
average 39, 53 and 63 seats, respectively (USDT 2010).40 Although the majority of passengers 
tend to stand in a vehicle rather than sit due to the limited seats, a large number of available seats 
lead to a broader capacity. In other words, more seats are associated with more space to stand for 
passengers. Therefore, I employ a different capacity measure using “the number of seats on an 
average vehicle for each mode,” by standardizing other vehicles’ seats divided by the number of 
seats of a bus. For example, 20 vehicles of a light rail are equivalent to about 32 buses.  
There are multiple transit agencies within a UA, and an agency services a single or multiple 
transportation modes. Thus, I measure the number of public transit vehicles based on the total 
number of vehicles across agencies within a UA. For instance, consider a UA that had two transit 
agencies A and B. If the maximum numbers of vehicles for a bus and a light rail were 100 and 20 
and were operated by agency A and agency B, respectively, then in a certain year the number of 
bus-equivalent vehicles of the UA would be 132 after adjusting for the different capacity of a 
vehicle between a bus and a light rail. 
I also consider alternative measures for public transportation accessibility: annual vehicle 
revenue miles and annual vehicle revenue hours. As discussed in Taylor et al. (2009), those two 
variables are usually used as measures of transit service supply. Annual vehicle revenue miles 
(hours) are the total miles (hours) “that vehicles are scheduled to or actually travel while in revenue 
                                                          




service and that include the layover/recovery time41 but exclude deadhead, operator training, and 
vehicle maintenance testing, as well as school bus and charter services.” Similar to the number of 
bus-equivalent vehicles, I use the vehicle revenue miles (hours) per 10,000 people in a local area 
to account for different population size.  
The amount of the UAF grants is obtained from each fiscal year Statistical Summary 
provided by the FTA. I collected this information from 2003 because the assigned urbanized areas’ 
names in 2002 were not consistent with the names since 2003. Therefore, data of the UAF federal 
grants are obtained from 2003 to 2008. Note that one-year, two-year, and three year-lagged funds 
are implemented as instruments. The FTA has provided the UAF grants by a UA with two 
population ranges: over 1,000,000 people and between 200,000 and 1,000,000 people. On the other 
hand, the amount of grants in areas with more than 50,000 but less than 200,000 people is available 
by state, not by a UA. Therefore, my local area sample does not contain those areas where the 
population is less than 200,000, and one of them is Laredo, Texas which has higher food insecurity 
rate in this sample. 
2.4.3 How to match MSAs and UAs 
As described above, the CPS-FSS contains food insecurity status of households with their 
home locations at the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level, while the number of public transit 
vehicles is available at the urbanized area (UA) level. Therefore, I need to match those two different 
geographic levels. The 2000 Census classifies an MSA and a UA using the population of areas. 
An MSA is defined as an area which has “at least one urbanized area of 50,000 or more inhabitants,” 
while a UA consists of “core census block groups or blocks that have a population density of at 
                                                          
41 Layover/recovery time is “a planned time allowance between the arrival time of a just completed trip and the 
departure time of the next trip in order to allow the route to return to schedule if traffic, loading, or other conditions 
have made the trip arrive late.” 
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least 1,000 people per square mile.” Therefore, I compare the population of counties that 
commonly belong to an MSA and a UA.  
I use the following three-step process for matching. As a first step, I match the names of 
MSAs and UAs: both MSAs and UAs have “area names” which consist of principle cities and state 
names according to the Census Bureau. An MSA consists of one or more whole counties, whereas 
a UA may consist of portions of counties. Therefore, in the second step, I calculate the population 
in 2000 in overlapped areas between MSAs and UAs.42 Third, I calculate the population share of 
areas that simultaneously belong to an MSA and a UA, or the population ratio between the 
common area and the united areas of an MSA and a UA. Then, I only keep areas if the population 
share of overlapped areas to the united areas of an MSA and a UA is greater than or equal to 80%. 
This implies that the population density of an MSA is high in a UA where public transportation 
system is concentrated. Furthermore, the NTD indicates that in some cases transportation system 
also covers the adjacent area of a UA so that it serves a larger population than is implied by the 
reported residents of a UA.43  






Name match between an 
MSA and a UA based on 
principle cities and state 
names.  
Calculate population of 
the overlapped areas 
= POP(MSA ∩  UA) 
Keep the areas satisfying 
POP(MSA ∩  UA)




                                                          
42 Population of overlapped areas between MSAs and UAs are only available in 2000. 
43 In my sample, there are 31 such areas reporting “a measure of access to transit service in terms of population” that 
is larger than the UA. 
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After the matching process above, 45 matched local areas remain, but 40 areas among them 
are used in the analyses because the population of five areas44 is between 50,000 and 200,000 and 
for those areas instrument variables are not available: see Appendix Table D.1 for the list of 40 
matched local areas. More explanation on how to match an MSA and a UA is provided, together 
with examples, in Appendix B. I call those matched local areas in my sample local areas.  
Figure 2.2 shows the geographic coverage of the dataset: gray areas represent the 369 
MSAs of the U.S. in 2003, while black areas indicate the 40 matched MSAs. Total population of 
40 MSAs accounts for almost the half of the population of 369 MSAs in 2000. Northeast, Midwest, 
South, and West Census regions contain 4, 7, 14, and 15 local areas, respectively: the proportion  
 
Source: 40 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (Black) and 369 MSAs (Gray) in 2003, created by the author 
based on the Cartographic Boundary Files, Census Bureau.  
Figure 2.2 Coverage of the created dataset 
 
                                                          
44 Five matched areas are “Decatur, IL,” “Fargo, ND-MN,” “Laredo, TX,” “Panama City-Lynn Haven-Panama City 
Beach, FL” and “Pueblo, CO.” Honolulu in Hawaii is also one of matched areas satisfying matching process. However, 
it is not included in final dataset because it is a non-continental area of the U.S. 
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of households’ in each region to total observation in my sample is about 20 percent, 17 percent, 
30 percent, and 33 percent, respectively. Furthermore, from 2006 to 2009, the food insecurity rate 
between the overall U.S. population and the 40 matched areas was virtually identical as 13%. 
Figures 2.3 displays the relationship between the food insecurity rate and the number of 
bus-equivalent vehicles in 40 local areas of final dataset from 2006 to 2009. The horizontal axis 
 
A. year 2006                                                                  B. year 2007 
 
    C. year 2008                                                                  D. year 2009 
Notes: X-axis is the number of bus-equivalent vehicles per 10,000 people. Y-axis refers to food insecurity 
rate. 




represents the number of bus-equivalent vehicles per 10,000 population in each local area, and the 
vertical axis measures the proportion of households that are food insecure. These four figures 
consistently show that there may exist a negative relationship between the rate of food insecurity 
and the number of public vehicles in local areas.  
2.4.4 Other control variables 
I obtain the annual unemployment rate and population at the MSA level, respectively, from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics and from the Census Bureau from 2006 to 2009. Two annual welfare 
variables are at the state level from 2006 to 2009. Public welfare expenditures are obtained from 
the Census Bureau and consist of cash assistance payments such as Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families; vendor payments such as medical care; and other public welfare such as support 
of private welfare agencies. The food stamp participation rate is from USDA Food and Nutrition 
Service. Summary statistics for above three measures of public transportation accessibility at the 
UA level as well as other local and state variables are presented in Table 2.2. 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Main Results 
Using the CPS-FSS sample from 2006 to 2009, I estimate a linear probability model where 
the dependent variable is dichotomous. Estimates are based on cross-sectional data using Equation 
(2.1). I use various measures of food insecurity for households with children as a dependent 
variable: 1) a binary indicator created using a different affirmative response as a cutoff, and 2) a 
categorical measure of food insecurity between 0 and 18. I also estimate regressions with food 
insecurity measures for households without children but do not report the results here because 




Table 2.2 Summary statistics for local and state variables from 2006 to 2009 
Variable Definition Mean SD 
Local variables     
  No. of bus-equi. vehicles 
     per 10,000 pop.a 
Total number of bus-equivalent vehicles, 
such as bus, vanpool, subway, light rail, and 
trolleybus, operated per 10,000 people in a 
local area 
2.92 1.89 
Vehicle revenue hours 
   per 10,000 pop.a 
Total vehicle revenue hours (1,000) per 
10,000 people in a local area: total hours 
“that vehicles are scheduled to or actually 
travel while in revenue service and that 
include the layover/recovery time but 
exclude deadhead, operator training, and 
vehicle maintenance testing, as well as 
school bus and charter services.”  
9.69 5.43 
Vehicle revenue miles 
   per 10,000 pop.a 
Total vehicle revenue miles (1,000) per 
10,000 people in a local area: total miles 
“that vehicles are scheduled to or actually 
travel while in revenue service and that 
include the layover/recovery time but 
exclude deadhead, operator training, and 
vehicle maintenance testing, as well as 
school bus and charter services.” 
141.9 80.11 
  Unemployment rate The unemployment rate in a local area 6.12 2.55 
Population Log of population in a local area 14.45 1.10 
1-year lag of the federal  
   transit funding 
One-year lagged UAF funds ($1,000) from 
the federal government per 10,000 
population 
192.2 125.9 
2-year lag of the federal  
   transit funding 
Two-year lagged UAF funds ($1,000) from 
the federal government per 10,000 
population 
172.9 119.0 
3-year lag of the federal  
   transit funding 
Three-year lagged UAF funds ($1,000) 
from the federal government per 10,000 
population 
165.0 96.5  
N  144 
 
 
State variables  
  Welfare expenditures 
Log of public welfare expenditures 
(1,000$) in a state 
15.81 0.93 
  Food stamp participation 
rate 
Food stamp participation rate (takeup rate) 
in a state 
70.59 11.62 
N  108 
Notes: a: Since yearly population at the UA level is not available, I use yearly population at the MSA 
level as a denominator. The standardization using UA population in 2000 does not make a significant 
difference. Local (state) variables are calculated at the local area (state) level, and CPS-FSS sampling 
weights are not applied for mean and standard deviation.  
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Table 2.3 provides the point estimates of my key parameter, public transportation 
accessibility measured by the number of bus-equivalent vehicles. I report results of the IV 
regression (odd-numbered columns) as well as those from OLS (even-numbered columns) for 
three samples −  all households, poor households, and non-poor households; note that poor 
households are defined as households with an income-to-poverty ratio less than 185%. A failure 
to take into account the potential endogeneity of public transit accessibility will result in biased 
estimates. Therefore, I use one-year, two-year, and three-year lagged Urbanized Area Formula 
(UAF) federal grants as instruments. The first stage coefficients of the instruments are presented 
at the bottom of Table 2.3 with F-statistics. For example, the F statistic of 22.23 in Column (1) 
suggests that the instruments are strong, and the estimates indicate that there are strongly 
significant positive effects of transit subsidies on the number of bus-equivalent vehicles. I also test 
exogeneity of instrument variables, which is not reported in this paper. I do not reject the null 
hypothesis that all instruments are valid and the regression specification is correct. 
Following Rasch scale score, a base food insecurity measure is created based on two 
affirmative responses as the cutoff of being food secure (Panel 1), as explained earlier. As a 
robustness check, I also employ a different cutoff from three to six affirmative responses (Panels 
2 through 5). Each Panel reports coefficients from two estimations (an IV and an OLS) for each 
sample. For example, Panel 1 shows the base estimates for all households reported in first two 
columns. There is one F-statistic associated with each IV regression because the first stage, which 
is at the UA level, does not change even if I use a different measure of food insecurity. I present 
all the coefficient estimates for the controls except for year and state dummies in Table D.2 in the 




Table 2.3 The impact of public transportation accessibility on food insecurity, 
independent variable: the number of bus-equivalent vehicles per 10,000 people 
 
All households Poor households 
Non-poor 
households 
 IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
By using a different cutoff       
Food insecurity = 1, otherwise 0      
  1. Using cutoff = 2 -0.0160*** -0.0001 -0.0181** -0.0115* -0.0157 0.0041 
 (0.0052) (0.0023) (0.0075) (0.0058) (0.0099) (0.0029) 
       
  2. Using cutoff = 3 -0.0171*** -0.0001 -0.0241** -0.0078 -0.0140* 0.0022 
 (0.0050) (0.0025) (0.0096) (0.0050) (0.0083) (0.0026) 
       
  3. Using cutoff = 4 -0.0084* 0.0008 -0.0052 -0.0016 -0.0108 0.0012 
 (0.0043) (0.0026) (0.0076) (0.0059) (0.0066) (0.0021) 
       
  4. Using cutoff = 5 -0.0105*** 0.0006 -0.0151*** -0.0038 -0.0079* 0.0022 
 (0.0033) (0.0015) (0.0053) (0.0034) (0.0047) (0.0017) 
       






-0.0098*** -0.0056 0.0006 
 (0.0029) (0.0010) (0.0072) (0.0033) (0.0041) (0.0012) 
By a categorical measure      
  6. Food insecurity  -0.1205*** -0.0208 -0.1599** -0.1098** -0.1076* 0.0120 
      = 0 to 18 (0.0333) (0.0139) (0.0668) (0.0401) (0.0614) (0.0161) 
      Dep. var. mean  0.9163  2.0933  0.3791  
       
Instruments       
  1-year lag of grants 0.0025***  0.0027***  0.0024***  
 (0.0005)  (0.0006)  (0.0005)  
  2-year lag of grants 0.0016***  0.0020***  0.0015***  
 (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0002)  
  3-year lag of grants 0.0026*  0.0028*  0.0024*  
 (0.0013)  (0.0014)  (0.0013)  
  F-statistics 22.23  27.20  19.77  
       
N 28,304 28,304 8,418 8,418 19,886 19,886 
Notes: A cutoff is the assigned number of affirmative responses to 18 food insecurity questions. A 
dichotomous indicator of food insecurity equals one if a household gives to the questionnaire more 
affirmative responses than the cutoff. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level in parentheses. 
* signifies statistical significance at the 10% level; ** at 5% level, and *** at the 1% level or less. The 
CPS-FSS sampling weights are used in each regression. All regressions contain other local, state, 




Column (1) presents the second stage results in the sample of all households after 
accounting for endogeneity and suggests that an additional bus-equivalent vehicle is statistically 
negatively associated with food insecurity regardless of food insecurity measures. In the 
specification using a binary indicator of food insecurity, the point estimate shows between 0.8 and 
1.7 percentage points reduction in the probability of being food insecure with an extra bus-
equivalent vehicle per 10,000 people. When poor households are only considered, the negative 
causal effect is maintained (Column (3)) except for the case with the food insecurity measure from 
four affirmative responses and the marginal effect becomes less than twice larger (between 1.5 and 
2.4 percentage points). Since the non-poor have more access to automobiles compared to the poor, 
as shown in Berube, Deakin, and Raphael (2006), it is expected that the non-poor are less likely to 
be dependent on public transit. In fact, there is little evidence of a significant effect of public 
transportation on food insecurity among the non-poor (Column (5)). Public transportation 
marginally matters to non-poor households when three and five affirmative answers are employed 
as cutoffs. Therefore, the role of public transportation is more critical to the poor than the non-
poor. These findings from three samples imply that the overall significant effect of transportation 
accessibility in the complete sample comes from the effect among the poor. 
Point estimates are economically significant. Column (1) of Table 2.3 reports a -0.016 
coefficient with the base food insecurity measure. In my sample, the average number of bus-
equivalent vehicles per 10,000 people is roughly 3, assuming an urbanized area has 200,000 
residents and 60 bus-equivalent vehicles. Since, on average, 13% of households are food insecure 
in the sample, the local area of the example has approximately 10,039 food insecure households 
or 26,000 food insecure people.45 About 1,236 households (or 3,200 people) would become food 
                                                          
45 According to the Census Bureau, there were 2.59 persons per household from 2006 to 2010. 
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secure as the number of bus-equivalent vehicles increases from 60 to 61 in the area. In this example, 
it would cost approximately $530,000 to purchase and $375,000 to operate one extra bus per year.46 
Equivalently, if this local area spends roughly $332,000 to purchase and $234,000 to operate a bus, 
the food insecurity rate would decrease by 1 percentage point.  
A binary food insecurity measure does not fully address a difference in the degrees of 
severity in the food security/insecurity condition. More specifically, the more questions were 
answered affirmatively, the more food insecure households were. Therefore, I employ 2SLS and 
OLS using the number of affirmative responses to CPS food insecurity questions as a categorical 
measure and Panel 6 of Table 2.3 presents the estimated results. Note that the food insecurity 
measure for households with children ranges from 0 to 18. Consistent to the previous estimates 
based on a binary indicator, I find evidence of a negative effect of public transportation on the 
extent of food insecurity among all and low income households but not among non-low income 
households. With addressing the endogeneity issue, the estimate implies that an additional bus-
equivalent vehicle would lead to 12 percent (mean = 0.92) decrease in the number of affirmative 
responses to food insecurity questions of households. Similar to Panels 1 through 5, the coefficient 
for the poor households’ sample is larger than that for the entire sample, 1.3 times larger for the 
categorical 0 to 18 scale measure. I do not report here, but I also run regressions with a log-
transformed measure of food insecurity.47 The results consistently support the role of the access to 
public transportation on food insecurity. 
                                                          
46 The cost to purchase a vehicle accounts for the majority of capital expenditures and the vehicle price ($531,605) of 
a diesel bus, which is “the most common type of bus in the U.S.” (See Figure 1 in USDT, FTA, 2007). I use $375,187 
as the total operation cost for a diesel bus (Figure 2). These estimated prices are 2006 values and in 2007 dollars. 
47 The food insecurity is defined to be zero if the household is fully food secure. For log transformation, I added one 
to each value of categorical 0 to 18 scale in order to retain the fully food secure households in the sample. For example, 
if the food insecurity is zero, it is scaled up to one, which is log-transformed. 
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Using the same sample used for the IV estimations, I also report OLS estimates in the even-
numbered columns of Table 2.3. Without addressing an endogeneity issue, the impact of public 
transportation accessibility on food insecurity is mostly not significantly different from zero. When 
comparing results between OLS and 2SLS, a failure to control for endogeneity would result in an 
insignificant effect of transit accessibility on food insecurity. The OLS analysis of the poor sample 
shows the negative relationship, but the effect is significant for Panels 1, 5 and 6 (Column (4)). 
The discrepancy in coefficients between the OLS and the 2SLS estimates may arise from 
the focus on subpopulation groups in this paper. Specifically, my sample focuses on urban areas 
with at least 200,000 people since the information for the number of public transportation and UAF 
grants is not available for rural areas. Also, the significant effects of public transportation 
accessibility on food insecurity in the 2SLS scheme may represent only the group of households 
without cars. In other words, my estimates may be driven by households with no cars who reside 
in urban areas with populations more than 200,000. Therefore, one needs to be careful in 
extrapolating these results to rural communities with populations less than 200,000. 
Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Moffitt (2005) emphasized that the external validity of 
instruments does not hold if IV does not vary for the entire population. I provide, therefore, 
estimates for the subsamples of the poor and of the African-American poor who are less likely to 
own cars and to whom the availability of public transportation as well as food insecurity matter 
the most. Below, I discuss the possibly different role of public transportation on food insecurity 
by race among the poor.  
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2.5.2 Comparison by race among poor households 
I find that access to public transportation is important in reducing the probability of facing 
food insecurity for the poor rather than for the non-poor. In this section, I test whether the role of 
public transportation differs depending on race among poor households.  
Table 2.4 estimates the relationship between public transportation and food insecurity for 
two subsamples. The results reveal that regardless of food insecurity measures, an extra bus-
equivalent vehicle is significantly associated with a lower propensity of being food insecure for 
poor black households but not for poor white households. In the sample of poor black households, 
the estimate is -0.0711 (Panel 2), three times higher in magnitude than that in the counterpart of 
poor households (Table 2.3).48 It implies that the significant role of public transit among the poor 
is driven by the high estimate for the African-American poor.  
This finding may raise two questions. The first question is why transit accessibility is a 
determinant of food insecurity only for the black poor, not for the white poor. The simple answer 
would be the disparity in car ownership between African-Americans and whites among the poor; 
i.e. poor blacks are less likely than poor whites to have access to cars. Berube, et al. (2006) 
documented that even among the poor, the car ownership rate for whites is higher than that for 
blacks. If this is the case, access to public transportation would affect food insecurity status 
differently for the black poor than the white poor. Then, what causes such a racial difference in 
car ownership even among the poor? Previous researchers described that in addition to household 
incomes, several factors may contribute to the racial disparity in car ownership. Those factors are 
discriminations in car prices (Ayres and Siegelman 1995),49 in interest rates on car loans (Charles  
                                                          
48 In the sample of poor black households, the F-value of the first stage is less than ten, which is presumably because 
the number of observations is small. 
49 However, there is disagreement about the existence of racial discrimination in a car price. Ayres and Siegelman 
(1995) found evidence that the black pay more for car purchase than the white using information of new car dealership 
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Table 2.4 The impact of public transportation accessibility on food insecurity  
by race among poor households, 
independent variable: the number of bus-equivalent vehicles per 10,000 people 
 Poor black households  Poor white households 
 IV OLS  IV OLS 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
By using a different cutoff     
Food insecurity = 1, otherwise 0     
  1. Using cutoff = 2 -0.0369† 0.0076  -0.0090 -0.0149* 
 (0.0292) (0.0113)  (0.0096) (0.0078) 
      
  2. Using cutoff = 3 -0.0711** -0.0114  -0.0086 -0.0058 
 (0.0359) (0.0142)  (0.0094) (0.0042) 
      
  3. Using cutoff = 4 -0.0424† 0.0009  0.0087 -0.0007 
 (0.0333) (0.0153)  (0.0086) (0.0060) 
      
  4. Using cutoff = 5 -0.0658* 0.0012  0.0024 -0.0038 
 (0.0365) (0.0132)  (0.0050) (0.0031) 
      
  5. Using cutoff = 6 -0.0606** -0.0207**  -0.0065 -0.0072* 
 (0.0306) (0.0092)  (0.0053) (0.0040) 
By a categorical measure      
  6. Food insecurity = 0 to 18 -0.4268* -0.0564  -0.0536 -0.1197*** 
 (0.2521) (0.1085)  (0.0674) (0.0399) 
      Dependent variable mean 2.723   1.939  
      
Instruments      
  One-year lag of grants 0.0029***   0.0027***  
 (0.0007)   (0.0006)  
  Two-year lag of grants 0.0018**   0.0021***  
 (0.0008)   (0.0003)  
  Three-year lag of grants 0.0043**   0.0025*  
 (0.0018)   (0.0013)  
  F-statistics 6.33   33.37  
      
N 1,852 1,852  6,566 6,566 
Notes: A cutoff is the assigned number of affirmative responses to 18 food insecurity questions. A 
dichotomous indicator of food insecurity equals one if a household gives to the questionnaire more 
affirmative responses than the cutoff. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level in parentheses. 
† signifies statistical significance at the 20% level; * at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 
1% level or less. The CPS-FSS sampling weights are used in each regression. All regressions contain 
other local, state, household, and household head variables (See Tables 2.1 and 2.2) in addition to year 
and state fixed effects.  
                                                          
in Chicago, while Goldberg (1996) found no evidence with a national sample. To my knowledge, none of papers has 
yet studied the racial discrimination in the price of a used car which is more affordable for low-income households. 
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et al. 2008),50 and in car insurance prices (Harrington and Niehaus 1998).51 Blacks tend to pay 
higher prices for cars as well as insurance than whites. Therefore, different prices between the two 
groups can explain the predominately low propensity of owning a car among blacks than whites. 
Furthermore, initial wealth differences could also account for the black-white gap in car ownership 
(Gautier and Zenou 2010).52 
The second concern could be the identification of public transportation. My sample does 
not contain information regarding whether a household owns an automobile. Hence, it might be 
argued that the estimate of access to public transportation could be biased because the information 
of family’s car ownership is not controlled for. However, my key variable, access to public transit, 
is measured at the urbanized area level and the regressions control for a host of household level 
variables that are correlated with car ownership. 
2.5.3 Robustness checks 
2.5.3.1 Alternative measure of public transportation: vehicle revenue hours and miles 
As robustness checks, I use different public transportation measures as a key independent 
variable: vehicle revenue hours and miles. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show the analyses for three samples 
classified by income-to-poverty ratio.  Each Panel and Column of Tables 2.5 and 2.6 is a 
counterpart of Table 2.3. Those estimates under alternative measures mostly support the negative 
impact of public transportation among poor and all households rather than among non-poor 
households. After controlling for endogeneity, the coefficients of the vehicle revenue hours (miles)  
                                                          
50 Using the Survey of Consumer Finances dataset, Charles et al. (2008) documented that the auto loan interests are 
higher for blacks, which is more conspicuous for financing arms of vehicle manufacturers such as General Motors 
Acceptance Corporation than for traditional banks.   
51 Harrington and Niehaus (1998) studied the insurance data from Missouri. 
52  Theoretically, they show that initial wealth difference leads to racial disparity in car ownership, resulting in 
differences in labor market outcomes such as employment status and wages. 
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Table 2.5 The impact of public transportation accessibility on food insecurity, 
independent variable: Vehicle revenue hours (1,000) per 10,000 people 
 
All households Poor households 
Non-poor 
households 
 IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
By using a different cutoff       
Food insecurity = 1, otherwise 0      
  1. Using cutoff = 2 -0.0043*** -0.0012 -0.0047** -0.0115* -0.0043* -0.0000 
 (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0022) (0.0058) (0.0026) (0.0013) 
       
  2. Using cutoff = 3 -0.0046*** -0.0009 -0.0063** -0.0078 -0.0038* -0.0002 
 (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0027) (0.0050) (0.0022) (0.0011) 
       
  3. Using cutoff = 4 -0.0022** -0.0005 -0.0014 -0.0016 -0.0029* -0.0004 
 (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0020) (0.0059) (0.0017) (0.0008) 
       
  4. Using cutoff = 5 -0.0028*** -0.0005 -0.0039*** -0.0038 -0.0021* 0.0001 
 (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0034) (0.0012) (0.0006) 
       
  5. Using cutoff = 6 -0.0029*** -0.0024** -0.0052** -0.0098*** -0.0015 -0.0002 
 (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0021) (0.0033) (0.0011) (0.0005) 
By a categorical measure      





      = 0 to 18 (0.0082) (0.0043) (0.0190) (0.0401) (0.0160) (0.0068) 
      Dep. var. mean 0.9163  2.0933  0.3791  
       
Instruments       
  1-year lag of  0.0094***  0.0105***  0.0087***  
     grants (0.0018)  (0.0019)  (0.0016)  
  2-year lag of  0.0060***  0.0073***  0.0053***  
     grants (0.0010)  (0.0012)  (0.0009)  
  3-year lag of  0.0097**  0.0106**  0.0088**  
     grants (0.0038)  (0.0041)  (0.0035)  
  F-statistics 22.26  25.89  21.85  
       
N 28,304 28,304 8,418 8,418 19,886 19,886 
Notes: A cutoff is the assigned number of affirmative responses to 18 food insecurity questions. A 
dichotomous indicator of food insecurity equals one if a household gives to the questionnaire more 
affirmative responses than the cutoff. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level in parentheses. 
* signifies statistical significance at the 10% level; ** at 5% level, and *** at the 1% level or less. The 
CPS-FSS sampling weights are used in each regression. All regressions contain other local, state, 





Table 2.6 The impact of public transportation accessibility on food insecurity,  
independent variable: Vehicle revenue miles (1,000) per 10,000 people 
 
 
All households Poor households 
Non-poor 
households 
 IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
By using a different cutoff       
Food insecurity = 1, otherwise 0      
  1. Using cutoff = 2 -0.0003*** -0.0000 -0.0003** -0.0002* -0.0003 0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
       
  2. Using cutoff = 3 -0.0003*** -0.0000 -0.0004** -0.0001 -0.0003* 0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
       
  3. Using cutoff = 4 -0.0002** 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
       
  4. Using cutoff = 5 -0.0002*** -0.0000 -0.0003*** -0.0001 -0.0001* 0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
       




-0.0002** -0.0001 -0.0000 
 (0.0006) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
By a categorical measure      
  6. Food insecurity  -0.0022*** -0.0006* -0.0030** -0.0020** -0.0019* 0.0000 
      = 0 to 18 (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0004) 
      Dep. var. mean 0.9163  2.0933  0.3791  
       
Instruments       
  1-year lag of  0.1317***  0.1446***  0.1227***  
     grants (0.0262)  (0.0286)  (0.0244)  
  2-year lag of  0.0919***  0.1107***  0.0828***  
      grants (0.0140)  (0.0178)  (0.0127)  
  3-year lag of  0.1230*  0.1327*  0.1123*  
      grants (0.0656)  (0.0695)  (0.0622)  
  F-statistics 24.00  26.88  22.42  
       
N 28,304 28,304 8,418 8,418 19,886 19,886 
Notes: A cutoff is the assigned number of affirmative responses to 18 food insecurity questions. A 
dichotomous indicator of food insecurity equals one if a household gives to the questionnaire more 
affirmative responses than the cutoff. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level in parentheses. 
* signifies statistical significance at the 10% level; ** at 5% level, and *** at the 1% level or less. The 
CPS-FSS sampling weights are used in each regression. All regressions contain other local, state, 




in Columns (1) and (3) of Table 2.5 (Table 2.6) are statistically significant, meaning that as public 
transit vehicles travel more in terms of hours (miles), the propensity for being food insecure 
decreases among complete and particularly low-income households. As in Table 2.3, the results in 
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 provide some evidence that more accessibility of public transportation is 
associated with the lower probability of food insecurity in the sample of the non-poor. However, 
the role of public transit is more crucial to the poor than to the non-poor in terms of significance 
and the magnitude of estimates. The estimates of the rest controls are fairly similar across different 
measures of public transportation (See Appendix Table D.2). 
I also apply these alternative measures of access to public transportation to the samples of 
the black poor and the white poor. The analyses are also available in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 where the 
significance of coefficients is comparable to that in Table 2.4 of this paper. Estimates from two 
tables confirm that public transportation accessibility reduces the risk of exposure to food 
insecurity for poor African-Americans but not for poor whites.  
2.6. Conclusion 
This study is the first analysis of whether public transportation accessibility at the local 
area level is an important determinant of food insecurity. I use a household-level food insecurity 
measure from the CPS-FSS and the information on public transportation accessibility from the 
National Transit Database during the period from 2006 to 2009. The results indicate that policy 
makers can consider an increase in public transit vehicles to reduce food insecurity, especially for 
the poor. 
Using federal governmental funding in the form of the Urbanized Area Formula grants as 
instruments for public transportation accessibility, I find evidence that public transportation lowers 
food insecurity of households. The significant effect is found for all and low income households  
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Table 2.7 The impact of public transportation accessibility on food insecurity  
by race among poor households, 
independent variable: Vehicle revenue hours (1,000) per 10,000 people 
 
 Poor black households  Poor white households 
 IV OLS  IV OLS 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
By using a different cutoff     
Food insecurity = 1, otherwise 0     
  1. Using cutoff = 2 -0.0112† 0.0013  -0.0023 -0.0044 
 (0.0085) (0.0034)  (0.0027) (0.0027) 
      
  2. Using cutoff = 3 -0.0216** -0.0045  -0.0023 -0.0020 
 (0.0107) (0.0044)  (0.0026) (0.0017) 
      
  3. Using cutoff = 4 -0.0129† -0.0016  0.0022 -0.0000 
 (0.0098) (0.0049)  (0.0022) (0.0019) 
      
  4. Using cutoff = 5 -0.0198* -0.0013  0.0006 -0.0012 
 (0.0108) (0.0041)  (0.0013) (0.0009) 
      
  5. Using cutoff = 6 -0.0183** -0.0080**  -0.0017 -0.0021* 
 (0.0093) (0.0033)  (0.0014) (0.0012) 
      
By a categorical measure      
  6. Food insecurity = 0 to 18 -0.1300* -0.0282  -0.0137 -0.0339** 
 (0.0747) (0.0336)  (0.0185) (0.0142) 
      
Instruments      
  One-year lag of grants 0.0102***   0.0106***  
 (0.0026)   (0.0020)  
  Two-year lag of grants 0.0059**   0.0077***  
 (0.0024)   (0.0011)  
 Three-year lag of grants 0.0136**   0.0098**  
 (0.0055)   (0.0039)  
  F-statistics 6.74   33.00  
      
N 1,852 1,852  6,566 6,566 
Notes: A cutoff is the assigned number of affirmative responses to 18 food insecurity questions. A 
dichotomous indicator of food insecurity equals one if a household gives to the questionnaire more 
affirmative responses than the cutoff. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level in parentheses. 
† signifies statistical significance at the 20% level; * at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 
1% level or less. The CPS-FSS sampling weights are used in each regression. All regressions contain 
other local, state, household, and household head variables (See Tables 2.1 and 2.2) in addition to year 
and state fixed effects. 
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Table 2.8 The impact of public transportation accessibility on food insecurity  
by race among poor households, 
independent variable: Vehicle revenue miles (1,000) per 10,000 people 
 
 Poor black households  Poor white households 
 IV OLS  IV OLS 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
By using a different cutoff     
Food insecurity = 1, otherwise 0     
  1. Using cutoff = 2 -0.0008† 0.0001  -0.0002 -0.0003 
 (0.0006) (0.0002)  (0.0002) (0.0002) 
      
  2. Using cutoff = 3 -0.0014* -0.0002  -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.0007) (0.0003)  (0.0002) (0.0001) 
      
  3. Using cutoff = 4 -0.0009† 0.0000  0.0002 0.0000 
 (0.0007) (0.0003)  (0.0002) (0.0001) 
      
  4. Using cutoff = 5 -0.0013* -0.0000  0.0001 -0.0000 
 (0.0008) (0.0002)  (0.0001) (0.0001) 
      
  5. Using cutoff = 6 -0.0012* -0.0005**  -0.0001 -0.0001* 
 (0.0006) (0.0002)  (0.0001) (0.0001) 
      
By a categorical measure      
  6. Food insecurity = 0 to 18 -0.0088* -0.0014  -0.0009 -0.0020** 
 (0.0052) (0.0021)  (0.0013) (0.0008) 
      
Instruments      
  One-year lag of grants 0.1508***   0.1440***  
 (0.0449)   (0.0277)  
  Two-year lag of grants 0.0955**   0.1146***  
 (0.0392)   (0.0151)  
 Three-year lag of grants 0.2011*   0.1180*  
 (0.0982)   (0.0646)  
  F-statistics 5.00   42.54  
      
N 1,852 1,852  6,566 6,566 
Notes: A cutoff is the assigned number of affirmative responses to 18 food insecurity questions. A 
dichotomous indicator of food insecurity equals one if a household gives to the questionnaire more 
affirmative responses than the cutoff. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level in parentheses. 
† signifies statistical significance at the 20% level; * at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 
1% level or less. The CPS-FSS sampling weights are used in each regression. All regressions contain 
other local, state, household, and household head variables (See Tables 2.1 and 2.2) in addition to year 
and state fixed effects. 
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but not for non-low income households. More specifically, in all households, an additional bus-
equivalent vehicle per 10,000 people is associated with a decrease in food insecurity of households 
by 1.6 percentage points. The marginal effect for the poor is roughly twice larger. These findings 
imply that the overall effect on food insecurity from public transportation in the sample of all 
households stems from the high impact estimated in poor households. Moreover, I find strong 
evidence that having access to public transportation would decrease the risk of exposure to food 
insecurity particularly for poor African-American households but not for poor white households. 
This result is consistent with the fact that relative to whites, blacks are less likely to own an 
automobile. As robustness checks, I use various food insecurity measures such as applying 
different cutoffs and a categorical measure between 0 and 18 instead of a binary indicator of food 
insecurity status. The relationship between food insecurity and public transportation is also 
examined with alternative measures of public transportation such as vehicle revenue hours and 
miles. Those estimates under alternative measures all support the negative causal effect. Overall, 











CHAPTER 3. THE IMPACT OF SNAP VEHICLE ASSET LIMITS ON 
ASSET ALLOCATION IN LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Social assistance programs typically include an ‘asset test,’ requiring that households own 
assets worth less than a threshold value in order to be eligible for assistance. This may discourage 
lower socio-economic status households from accumulating assets. It may also influence 
households’ decisions to hold different types of assets, depending on how the different types of 
assets are treated in asset tests. At the same time, social assistance programs reduce the need for 
precautionary savings by providing households with a consumption floor.  
Based on these observations, Hubbard et al. (1995) developed a theoretical model that 
explains the low average savings rate of lower socio-economic status households. Following 
Hubbard et al. (1995), several empirical papers have investigated the impact of income transfer 
programs on household behaviors. For example, Neumark and Powers (1998) investigated the 
impact of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits on savings of individuals nearing 
retirement age. Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) found a negative effect of Medicaid on savings, and 
Engen and Gruber (2001) described the negative impact of unemployment insurance on the asset 
accumulation of workers.  
Powers (1998) investigated the impact of asset limits on households receiving Aid for 
Families with Dependent Children Program (AFDC). Using a first-difference specification for the 
1979 and 1983 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women, Powers (1998) 
concluded that relaxing asset limits by one dollar leads to an increase in savings by 25 cents for 
households headed by single mothers. On the other hand, Hurst and Ziliak (2006) examined 
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changes to the AFDC/TANF 53 asset limits during the 1990s and found little evidence that asset 
requirements explain savings behavior of poor households. 
In addition to setting the maximum total amount of assets that may be held by households, 
eligibility rules for social assistance programs contain provisions about how different types of 
assets should be counted towards the asset limit. For example, most forms of retirement wealth are 
exempt from being counted towards the asset limit in the TANF program and the Supplemental 
Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP).54 Housing wealth is also excluded.  
The federal TANF and SNAP program rules describe how the value of a household’s 
vehicle should be treated in the context of asset limits. The consideration of vehicles is particularly 
important in the context of social support programs for two reasons. First, the value of a vehicle 
makes up a large proportion of the total wealth of poor households, particularly for single mothers 
(Sullivan, 2006). Second, if the program rules provide a disincentive for households to own cars, 
then this affects individuals’ mobility, their ability to work, and limits access to grocery stores. 
Therefore, asset limits may be at odds with U.S. social support policy, which emphasizes 
individual responsibility. 
Several papers investigated changes to the way that vehicles are treated in the asset test for 
the TANF program. However, there is no consensus in the literature regarding the impact of 
vehicle asset rules on household savings behavior and asset allocation choice. Sullivan (2006) 
concluded that a more relaxed TANF vehicle asset policy is positively associated with 
accumulation of vehicle assets for single mothers. Particularly, he found that excluding vehicles 
                                                          
53 TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) is the welfare program that succeeded the AFDC in July 1996. 
54 The “Food Stamp Program” was renamed the “Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)” in 2008 as 
part of an effort to reduce the stigma associated with transfer program participation. Although my data pertain to a 
time period before the program was renamed, I will refer to the Food Stamp Program as well as SNAP synonymously 
throughout this paper.  
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from asset tests generates an increase in vehicle equity by around $565. On the other hand, Hurst 
and Ziliak (2006) found no impact of TANF vehicle policy changes. Most recently, Owens and 
Baum (2012) found that relaxed TANF vehicle asset rules increase the amount of vehicle assets 
held by households.  
In this paper, I contribute to the literature by examining the impact of relaxing vehicle asset 
rules in the SNAP program. This paper is the first to analyze the impact of vehicle asset rules in 
the SNAP program. I use a difference-in-difference specification as well as a household-level fixed 
effects model. Using household fixed effects allows us to exploit with-household variations to 
identify an effect of relaxed vehicle policies on household behavior. This is an important 
improvement over the previous literature. Hurst and Ziliak (2006) used a first difference 
specification, while Sullivan (2006) relied on repeated cross sections.  
I find that liberalizing SNAP asset rules increases vehicle assets of single parents with low 
education. I focus on this group because of their high ex ante probability of SNAP program 
participation (Sullivan 2006; Ziliak and Hurst 2006). The magnitude of the impact is large. After 
the vehicle policy is relaxed, households own a car that is $2,000 more valuable compared to 
before the policy change. Particularly, I find evidence that low educated single parents who already 
owned a car before the policy change tend to buy more expensive cars once vehicle asset policies 
are relaxed. The results also suggest that households take on more debt in order to finance their 
vehicles. Liberalizing vehicle asset rules has no impact on liquid asset holdings as well as no 
impact on non-housing wealth and total wealth.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In section 3.2, I provide background 
information on the vehicle assets rules for SNAP eligibility and the policy changes that I 
investigate. I discuss my empirical strategy in section 3.3 and describe the construction of the data 
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set in section 3.4. I present and discuss results from the empirical estimation in section 3.5, and 
section 3.6 concludes.  
3.2 Background of the vehicle assets rules and policy changes 
The Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP) is funded by the Federal 
Government, but is administered at the state level. Historically, eligibility rules for SNAP benefits 
were determined at the federal level, and the rules were generally identical across all states.  
Federal program rules specify that individuals may have up to $2,250 in countable 
resources in order to be eligible for SNAP benefits. 55 Countable resources include assets such as 
checking and savings account balances. Countable resources according to the federal rules also 
include the fair market value of a household’s vehicle, minus the SNAP’s standard auto exemption 
of $4,650. For example, if a household owns a car with a fair market value of $6,000, then $1,350 
(= $6,000 - $4,650) are added as a countable resource.56  
The federal vehicle asset limit was set at $4,500 in 1977. The threshold is not indexed to 
inflation, and the limit has increased by only $150 since its implementation. The fact that the asset 
limit has increased so little over time has been criticized in the literature. For example, Super and 
Dean (2001) show that the vehicle asset limit implemented in 1977 corresponds to about $13,000 
in 2000 nominal dollars. Super and Dean (2001) argue that the decline of the real asset limit over 
time increasingly presents a barrier to SNAP participation for low income households that are car 
dependent.  The SNAP vehicle asset limit has also been criticized as inconsistent with government 
                                                          
55 The limit for countable resources has increased from $2,000 to $2,250 as of October 2014 for a household without 
an elderly person (defined as one who is at least 60 years old) or a disabled one. The limit is $3,250 if a household 
contains at least an elderly or disabled individual. A person is considered to be disabled if he or she receives federal 
disability payments such as Social Security Disability, Supplemental Security Income or Railroad Retirement 
payments or general assistance because of disability. 
56 Income-producing vehicles (such as a taxi) or vehicles used as a primary residence are not subject to a vehicle asset 
test. Also, if vehicle equity (i.e. fair market value minus amount owed for the car) is less than $1,500, the vehicle is 
considered an inaccessible resource and is excluded from the asset test.  
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welfare goals encouraging higher employment, since owning a reliable vehicle is crucial for access 
to jobs and grocery stores for households living in areas with poor public transportation systems 
(Wemmerus 1993). 
  As a result of the Hunger Relief Act of 1999, states were given the authority to determine 
their own eligibility standards for SNAP. Starting in July 2001, states began to align their SNAP 
vehicle policy with other vehicle policies used for social assistance programs administered at the 
state level (Super and Dean 2001). Specifically, states had the option to apply the rules of their 
respective TANF or Maintenance of Effort (TANF/MOE) funded programs to the state’s SNAP 
rules. This, however, was only possible if those programs had more liberal asset requirements 
compared to the federal SNAP rules. States had the option to implement any vehicle policy they 
saw fit (for example, raising the asset limit, excluding a vehicle entirely from the asset test, etc.) 
as long as the state-level policy was at least a generous as the federal rules. The idea behind the 
changes was to ease the administrative burden of different eligibility tests across different 
assistance programs, and to extend eligibility to a larger pool of individuals.57  
Table 3.1 lists vehicle asset policy changes across states. I obtained each state’s SNAP 
vehicle asset policy from the SNAP policy database of the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA). This includes the exact month and year that a particular vehicle asset policy was 
implemented by state, as well as the nature of the policy. The exact vehicle policies differ slightly 
between the states. In most cases, states decided to exclude entirely the value of one vehicle in a  
                                                          
57  Starting with the fiscal year 2001, states were also authorized to offer broad-based categorical eligibility to 
households if they received any benefit from the state that was paid by TANF funds. Broad based categorical eligibility 
eliminates the need for any asset tests if individuals received a TANF funded benefit from the state. For example, a 
TANF funded benefit could be a brochure that was printed using TANF funds and that lists state resources available 
to low income residents. If an individual meets the state-determined criteria to be eligible to receive this brochure, 
then the individual is not subject to asset test according to SNAP rules. Since changes in vehicle asset policies apply 
only to a very small minority of low-income households when broad-based categorical eligibility is implemented in a 
state, I drop states with broad-based categorical eligibility from my sample.  
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Table 3.1 State-level vehicle asset rule for the SNAP eligibility 
State 
After policy change Included in Subsample of 
States Used for Household 




Alabama 2001 Sep Exempt All vehicles  
Arizona 2003 Jun Exempt All vehicles Yes 
Arkansas 2001 Sep Exempt One vehicle  
California 2003 Dec Exempt One vehicle Yes 
Colorado 2001 Jul Exempt One vehicle  
Florida 2001 Sep More than federal SNAP rule  
Georgia 2005 Dec Exempt All vehicles  
Idaho 2007 May Exempt One vehicle  
Illinois 2001 Sep Exempt One vehicle  
Indiana 2002 Jan Exempt All vehicles Yes 
Iowa 2004 Jun Exempt One vehicle  
Kansas 2001 Sep Exempt All vehicles  
Kentucky 2001 Sep Exempt All vehicles  
Louisiana 2001 Sep Exempt All vehicles  
Minnesota 2003 Jun Exempt All vehicles Yes 
Mississippi 2003 Oct Exempt All vehicles Yes 
Missouri 2001 Sep Exempt All vehicles  
Montana 1996 Feb Exempt One vehicle  
Nebraska 2002 Jan More than federal SNAP rule Yes 
Nevada 2001 Sep Exempt One vehicle  
New Hampshire 2001 Sep Exempt One vehicle  
New Jersey 2001 Sep More than federal SNAP rule  
New Mexico 2002 Jan Exempt All vehicles Yes 
New York 2002 Jan Exempt One vehicle Yes 
North Carolina 2001 Jul Exempt One vehicle  
Ohio 2001 Sep Exempt All vehicles  
Oklahoma 2001 Sep More than federal SNAP rule  
Pennsylvania 2001 Sep Exempt One vehicle  
Rhode Island 2003 Jun Exempt All vehicles Yes 
Tennessee 2003 Dec Exempt All vehicles Yes 
Utah 2001 Sep More than federal SNAP rule  
Virginia 2002 Sep Exempt One vehicle Yes 
Washington 2004 May Exempt All vehicles  
West Virginia 2001 Sep Exempt All vehicles  
Wisconsin  2001 Sep Exempt All vehicles  
Note: Source: SNAP State Policy Database, United States Department of Agriculture. My sample does 
not include Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Dakota, Oregon, South 
Carolina, and Texas because these states implemented broad-based categorical eligibility for SNAP 
during the sample period. South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming are not included in my final sample 
because the SIPP does not individually identify these states due to small state population. Connecticut is 
dropped because vehicle asset policies changed multiple times during the sample period. Hawaii and 
Alaska are not included because federal SNAP program rules, the federal poverty line, and other policies 
differ for the non-continental United States.  
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household or the value of all vehicles in a household from the asset limit calculations.58 Some 
states chose to significantly raise the exemption value more than the federal SNAP rule. For 
example, Nebraska increased the exemption value to $12,000 in January 2002. 
3.3 Empirical strategy 
In this paper I investigate the impact of relaxing vehicle asset rules on vehicle assets and 
savings behavior for households that have a high probability of receiving food stamps. I focus on 
single parents with a high school education or less. Around 45 percent of households in this group 
received SNAP benefits. Of course, not all single parents with low education are eligible for SNAP 
benefits, and not all eligible households choose to participate in SNAP. However, single parent 
households with low education have a high ex ante probability of participating in SNAP. 
Consistent with the theoretical model of Hubbard et al (1995), and as discussed in the previous 
literature, I therefore examine how this group responds changes in vehicle asset rules (Ashenfelter 
1983; National Research Council 2001). 
I first estimate equations of the form 
(3.1)  𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿𝑍𝑠𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡      
where 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 is outcomes of interest for household 𝑖 living in state 𝑠 during year 𝑡. 𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑠𝑡 
is a dummy variable that takes a value of one when a vehicle assets policy that was more relaxed 
than the federal standard was effective in state 𝑠 at time 𝑡. 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 contains a vector of household 
characteristics such as the sex and race of the head of household, education level of the head of 
household, the number of household members, and the age of the head of household. In order to 
control for different savings rates of individuals across the life cycle, I include a polynomial in the 





age of the head of household as a control (Hubbard et al. 1995). 𝑍𝑠𝑡 contains a vector of time-
varying state characteristics, including SNAP policy rules that capture differences in how the 
SNAP program was administered in each state, as well as other state-level controls. I discuss these 
variables in more detail in the data section. 
Equation (3.1) contains a full set of year dummies, 𝜏𝑡, as well as a full set of state dummies, 
𝜇𝑠. The coefficient of interest, 𝛽, can therefore be interpreted as a difference-in-difference estimate 
of implementing a relaxed SNAP vehicle asset policy. In addition, I estimate specifications that 
make use of the longitudinal nature of the data.  I track households over time and estimate the 
following household fixed effects specification 
(3.2)  𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿𝑍𝑠𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡                          
𝛼𝑖 is a household level fixed effect, and 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 contains only time-varying characteristics of 
the household. I do not include state dummies in Equation (3.2) because I include household fixed 
effects and restrict my sample to households who did not move during the sample period. Including 
a household level fixed effect in Equation (3.2) allows us to exploit with-household variations to 
identify an effect of relaxed vehicle policies on household behavior. This removes the effect of 
any time-invariant unobservable characteristics of households that may otherwise confound the 
results. This is an important improvement over the previous literature, which relied on first 
difference specifications (Hurst and Ziliak 2006) or repeated cross sections (Sullivan 2006).  
I estimate Equations (3.1) and (3.2) for the at-risk group comprised of single parents with 
a high school education or less. I focus on this group because of their high ex ante probability of 
SNAP program participation (Sullivan 2006; Ziliak and Hurst 2006). I also investigate whether 
the impact of changes to vehicle asset policies on vehicle assets and debt is driven by households 
that already owned a car before the policy change deciding to buy more expensive vehicles, or 
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whether the impact is driven by households that did not own a car before the policy change 
deciding to buy a car. Finally, as a falsification test I estimate specifications using the sample of 
childless individuals. Household without children have a lower ex ante probability of SNAP 
participation, and are therefore less likely to be affected by the vehicle asset policy changes. 
3.4 Data 
3.4.1 SIPP 
I use household-level panel data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP). The SIPP is a series of longitudinal surveys that contains information related to income 
and wealth from a nationally representative sample of U.S. households. I use the 2001 panel of the 
SIPP, which covers the years 2001 – 2003. This time period coincides with the implementation 
dates of the SNAP vehicle exemption policy in several states.59 Households are interviewed during 
the same calendar month in each year of the survey, and I am able to track each household over 
time.   
I link the Core SIPP with the SIPP Topical Module. The Core SIPP includes demographic 
information of household members, while the Topical Module contains information about a 
household’s vehicles, as well as details about other types of assets and debt of the households. Not 
all SIPP respondents participate in the Topical Module. Information from the Topical Module is 
available for SIPP surveys conducted in September, October, November, and December in each 
year of the survey. Since each respondent household takes the survey during their same assigned 
calendar month each year, the same households participate in the Topical Module each year. 
                                                          
59 I discuss the timing and nature of changes in states’ vehicle policies in the next section. 
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Therefore, I am able to obtain information regarding vehicle, assets, and debts for about a third of 
the overall SIPP sample, and I am able to track households’ answers over time.60  
Of particular interests in this paper are car value, or car ownership, the number of cars, and 
the total amount of money that the household owed for cars, which are available at the household 
level. Based on the information of a vehicle’s make, model, and model year reported by the 
household, the SIPP imputes the fair market value of the vehicle using Blue Book values. 
Importantly, states determine the fair market value of a vehicle in the same way for the purpose of 
SNAP eligibility. The survey also collects information about the amount of debt that is owed on 
the vehicles owned by a household. Liquid assets are calculated as the sum of dollar amounts in 
checking and saving accounts, bonds/securities, stocks, and other financial investments (Hubbard 
et al, 1995). I sum up the liquid assets, IRA accounts, business equity, and vehicle equity to create 
non-housing net wealth.61 All dollar amounts in this paper are expressed in constant 2005 values.  
Following Hurst and Ziliak (2006), I apply several sample restrictions. I exclude 
households that moved between states between interviews. I restrict the sample to households 
where the head of the household was between 18 and 60 years of age in 2001, and I exclude 
households with elderly or disabled household members because different SNAP assets 
requirements apply to households with elderly or disabled household members. In my household 
fixed effects specifications I only include the households that appeared at least twice during the 
sample period. 
I only consider states that did not adopt broad-based categorical eligibility (BBCE) at any 
time from 2001 to 2003. As explained in the previous section,62 broad-based categorical eligibility 
                                                          
60 Appendix C provides a detailed description of the SIPP’s complex survey design, including the structure of the 
waves, rotation groups, and reference month.  
61 Vehicle equity is defined as the car market value less dollar amounts a household owes. 
62 See footnote 57. 
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eliminates the asset test for all but a very small proportion of SNAP applicants. Nine states adopted 
BBCE during my sample period, and I exclude these states from my final data set.63 South Dakota, 
Vermont, and Wyoming are not included in my final sample. The SIPP does not individually 
identify these states due to small state population. Connecticut is excluded because vehicle asset 
rule for SNAP eligibility changed multiple times.64 Alaska and Hawaii are excluded because 
SNAP program rules, the federal poverty line, and other policies differ for the non-continental 
areas of the United States.  
Out of the remaining 35 states, 20 implemented their vehicle policy before September 2001 
and four states implemented their vehicle policy after December 2003. I include these 24 states 
when estimating specifications according to Equation (3.1), but I exclude them from my household 
fixed effects estimations because vehicle policies did not change during the sample period, and my 
fixed effects specifications exploit within-individual variations.65 Table 3.1 displays when each 
state implemented their own vehicle asset policy, as well as a brief description of the new policy.66  
I match information about states’ vehicle asset policies with the SIPP data. In particular, I 
create a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a relaxed vehicle asset policy was in effect in 
a household’s state of residence at the time of the SIPP interview, and a value of zero otherwise. 
Exact vehicle policies differ slightly between states, but all policy changes effectively increased 
the value of a car that a household may have without becoming ineligible for SNAP benefits. Since 
the primary focus of this paper is the impact of relaxed vehicle asset policies on household 
behaviors I will use this dummy variable as my primary variable of interest in all specifications.  
                                                          
63 They are Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, and Texas. 
64 Specifically, one vehicle was exempted until 2001 August, then exemption rule was dropped, and then the rule was 
relaxed again in 2002 September. 
65 The final sample for household fixed effects estimation contains households from the following eleven states: 
Arizona, California, Indiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, Tennessee, 
and Virginia.  
66 Appendix Table D.3 presents vehicle policy information for states that are not included in my sample. 
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3.4.2 State-level control variables 
I control for several other policy changes that occurred during my sample period that relate 
to the way that states administered SNAP (Ratcliffe, Makernan, and Finegold 2008). First, the 
1996 welfare reform required states to implement an electronic benefit transfer (EBT) system for 
distributing SNAP benefits by October 2002. Instead of the paper coupons that were historically 
used by food stamps recipients to purchase food, the EBT systems provide recipients with an 
electronic benefit card that works similar to debit cards. The EBT systems were expected to 
increase SNAP participation due to the decrease in stigma associated with using SNAP benefits, 
and I control for their effect by including a variable that measures the proportion of the dollar value 
of SNAP benefits issued by EBT in each state.  
I also control for differences in states’ outreach activities that aim to inform low-income 
households about SNAP. I include a variable that measures time-varying outreach spending of 
each state. Following Ratcliffe, Makernan, and Finegold (2008) I use the dollar value of annual 
state outreach spending divided by the population below 150 percent of the poverty line that is not 
receiving SNAP benefits.    
Aaronson et al (2012) found that minimum wage workers increase expenditures on durable 
goods after a minimum wage increase. In particular, they found that the majority of the spending 
increase goes towards vehicles. If a state increases the state level minimum wage at the same time 
that SNAP vehicle asset rules change, then this would confound my results. Therefore, I control 
for the state-level effective minimum wage in all my specifications.  
Vehicle owners and operators are subject to vehicle taxes and registration fees collected by 
states and local governments. Changes in taxes and fees directly impact the cost of owning and 
operating a vehicle, and therefore it is important that I control for their effect. I obtained historical 
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state tax collections by state from the Census Bureau, and control for per capita state vehicle taxes 
and fees in all regressions.  
I also control for state-level welfare expenditures. Specifically, I include spending on 
Temporary assistance for Needy Families (TANF), as well as the state-level Maintenance of Effort 
(MOE) obtained from the Administration for Children and Families, U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services. Finally, I control of other time varying state-level characteristics that are 
related to food security. In particular, I include state-level quarterly manufacturing wages from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, as well as state-level quarterly unemployment rates from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
3.4.3 Descriptive statistics 
I describe all variables used in this study, as well as the summary statistics, in Table 3.2. 
The first three columns of Table 3.2 contain descriptive statistics for households living in the 35 
states used to estimate difference-in-differences specifications according to Equation (3.1). 
Columns (4)-(6) contain descriptive statistics for the eleven states used to estimate household fixed 
effects specifications according to Equation (3.2). Some of the states that are included in the 35-
state sample had implemented a relaxed vehicle asset policy prior to the start of out sample period. 
Seventy-seven percent of households in the 35-state sample had a relaxed vehicle asset policy in 
place at the time of the survey. Since my fixed effects estimates require within-household 
variations of the vehicle policy, the sample is reduced to those eleven states that changed their 
vehicle asset policy during the sample period. Fifty percent of observations for households from 





Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics for low educated single parents, SIPP from 2001 to 2003 
Variable Definition 
 
Households from 35 States 
Used in Difference-in-
Differences Specifications 
 Households from 11 States 




Policy Change  Mean 
(SD) 
Policy Change 
 Before After  Before  After 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Relaxed Vehicle  
   Asset Policy 
=1 if the household lived in a state that  
had implemented a relaxed vehicle  
asset policy at the time of the survey  















  Car Market Value  Fair market value (FMV) of cars that 














  Car Market Value 
 
Fair market value (FMV) of cars that  
households own, conditional on  














  Car Equity The amount of car equity (FMV minus  











































   Wealth  
The amount of wealth other than house  














  Total Wealth Sum of Non-housing wealth and house  














  Car Ownership =1 if household owned a car,  














Household Head Variables 
  HH Size:  
  2 Individuals 
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Table 3.2. continued 
  HH Size:  
  3 Individuals 














  HH Size:  
  4+ Individuals 
=1 if household size  is 4 or more,  














  Less than high 
    school diploma 
= 1 if a household head had less than  














  High school 
    diploma or GED 
= 1  if the head of the household has a  




























Male =1 if a household head is male,  














Female =1 if a household head is female,  














White =1 if a household head is white,  














Black =1 if a household head is black,  














Other Race =1 if a household head is other race,  














Reduced Lunch =1 if any children in the household  














State-Level Characteristics         














TANF Log of expenditure on Temporary 














MOE Log of expenditure on Maintenance of  
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Table 3.2. continued 














Vehicle Tax Dollar value of per capita state vehicle  
taxes and fees collected in the quarter    














State-Level SNAP Policy Rules         
EBT Issuance Percentage of dollar value of FSP  
















Outreach Spending Dollar value of outreach spending  
divided by the population below 150%     
















N   1,522 347 1,175  407 202 205 
Notes:  Data are from SIPP panels: Wave 3 in 2001, Wave 6 in 2002, and Wave 9 in 2003. Only includes single parents who have a high school 
diploma or less education. Vehicles include cars, vans and trucks, but exclude recreational vehicles (RVs) and motorcycles.  Values of each 
vehicle are aggregated if a household owns multiple cars. Liquid assets contain dollar amounts in checking and saving accounts, bonds/securities, 
stocks, and other financial investments. Non-housing wealth includes liquid assets, IRA accounts, business equity, and vehicle equity. Dollar 









In my main specification I estimate the impact of state vehicle asset policies on vehicle 
value, treating the vehicle value as zero if a household did not own a car. Table 3.2 shows that for 
the sample of 35 states used in the difference-in-differences specification, the mean fair market 
value of cars is $3,513 before the vehicle policy change, and $3,582 after the policy change.67 
Similarly, the mean car market value increases from $2,938 to $3,291 for the 11-state sample used 
for household fixed effects model. Conditional on having a car, the mean fair market values of 
vehicles in the household from the 35-state sample and the 11-state sample are $5,947 and $5,300 
before the policy change, respectively. The mean fair market value is above the federal vehicle 
asset limit of $4,650, and therefore the limit appears to be binding in both samples.68 After the 
policy change, the mean fair market value of vehicles decreases to $5,919 in the former sample, 
but increases to $5,867 in the latter sample. Descriptive statistics of most other variables are very 
similar between the samples. Once exception is education. Fifty-eight percent of households from 
the 11-state sample have a high school diploma, while 67 percent of the 35-state sample completed 
high school.  
  There are some differences in household characteristics after a vehicle asset policy change 
compared to before the policy change. As expected, household heads from both samples are 
slightly older after the policy change. Household heads are also more likely to have a high school 
diploma or have completed their GED. Since education may be correlated with a household’s asset 
allocation decisions, it is important to control for education in my specifications.  
                                                          
67 14.3 percent of households own more than one car. This may be the case when a single parent has a child that is of 
driving age. In this case I use the sum of the fair market values of all vehicles in the household. 
68 Sullivan (2006) reports an average market value of car of $5,760 in 1996 dollars (about $7,170 in 2005 dollars) for 
single mothers with at most a high school education for the time period 1992 to 1999. For 2001-2003 I find an average 
of $5,587 or $5,925, depending on the sample used.  The difference in the real car value may be the result of using 




3.5.1 Difference-in-differences estimates  
Table 3.3 displays the results of estimating specifications according to Equation (3.1), 
explaining the impact of vehicle asset policies on the value of a household’s car, equity in the car, 
amount owed on the car, as well as the probability of owning a car. All regressions include controls 
for individual characteristics of the head of the household, family characteristics, state level 
characteristics and policies, as well as state fixed effects and year dummies. Since each household 
may appear in multiple years of the survey, I cluster all standard errors at the household level in 
order to account for within-household correlation of errors. I assign a fair market value of zero for 
households that did not own a car. I find no statistically significant impact of relaxing vehicle asset 
policies on the value of a household’s car, equity in the car, or the amount owed on the car at 
conventional levels of statistical significance (Columns 1-3). However, the point estimate from the 
car value equations is positive and large, with a p-value of 0.15. Column (4) shows that relaxing 
vehicle asset policies increase the probability of owning a car by seven percentage points. Sixty 
percent of low educated single parent household own a car in this sample. The results in Column 
(4) represent a twelve percent increase over this baseline, and therefore the impact is economically 
significant as well.  
Coefficients of all control variables have the expected sign. For example, more education 
is positively associated with car values and with the probability of owning a car, and females are 
less likely to own a car compared to males. Similar to Aaronson et al (2012), I find that an increase 





Table 3.3 The impact of relaxed SNAP vehicle asset policy on car value, car equity, car debt, and 
car ownership of low educated single parents – Difference-in-Differences 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Car Value Car Equity Car Debt 
Car 
Ownership 
Relaxed Vehicle Asset Policy 823.2 -183.6 1006.8 0.0740* 
 (576.7) (609.1) (882.3) (0.0400) 
HH Size: 3 Individuals 208.1 328.8 -120.7 0.00514 
 (384.3) (371.7) (403.0) (0.0360) 
     
HH Size: 4+ Individuals  -59.82 252.7 -312.5 -0.0845** 
 (396.0) (417.5) (480.1) (0.0403) 
     
High School Education or GED 1633.5*** 852.8** 783.9** 0.163*** 
 (310.6) (331.4) (365.9) (0.0361) 
     
Age -57.18 -1567.4*** 1510.2** 0.0824 
 (560.1) (578.5) (608.0) (0.0597) 
     
Age-Square 8.149 43.84*** -35.69** -0.00152 
 (14.80) (15.34) (16.62) (0.00159) 
     
Age-Cube -0.112 -0.378*** 0.266* 0.0000 
 (0.124) (0.129) (0.144) (0.0000) 
     
Female -1305.3** -55.14 -1250.2 -0.110*** 
 (596.3) (715.4) (902.7) (0.0420) 
     
Race: Black -1528.3*** -610.6* -917.8** -0.216*** 
 (354.4) (346.0) (383.1) (0.0374) 
     
Race: Other -584.7 -780.3+ 195.6 -0.123 
 (676.2) (490.7) (770.5) (0.0880) 
     
Reduced Lunch -953.7*** 34.83 -988.5** -0.0750** 
 (357.5) (384.5) (417.4) (0.0306) 
     
Min. Wage 4311.7** 3407.5* 904.2 0.0811 
 (1805.0) (2015.6) (1982.1) (0.213) 
Household Fixed Effect No No No No 
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Family Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Level Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Level SNAP Policy Rules Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,522 1,522 1,522 1,522 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Estimates use data from the Survey of Income Program Participation (SIPP). Sample includes single 
parents with a high school education or less during the sample period, 2001-2003. State-level 
characteristics include log of TANF and MOE expenditures, unemployment rate, log of manufacturing 
wages, and state vehicle taxes and fees. State-level SNAP policy rules are percentage of FSP benefits 
issued by electronic benefits transfer (EBT) and outreach spending per capita.  
64 
 
Table 3.4 shows specifications estimated according to Equation (3.1) describing the impact 
of vehicle asset policies on households’ liquid assets, non-housing wealth, and total wealth. There 
is no significant impact of the policy change on the amount of liquid assets that household hold. 
Liquid assets include checking account balances, savings account balances, and similarly liquid 
financial assets. Single parents with low education hold on average only about $1,831 in liquid 
assets, and larger families tend to have more liquid assets. Consistent with the previous literature, 
I find no evidence of the impact of relaxing vehicle asset policies on liquid (Owens and Baum 
2012; Hurst and Ziliak 2006; Sullivan 2006). Non-housing wealth is a broader measure of wealth 
that includes liquid assets, as well as other financial assets. Table 3.4 shows that relaxing vehicle 
asset policies does not affect non-housing wealth either. Finally, there is no significant effect of 
vehicle policy changes on total wealth, which I obtained by adding real estate equity on non-
housing wealth. 
3.5.2 Fixed effects estimates 
My preferred specification exploits within-household variations and includes a household 
fixed effect in order to track households over time. Results of these household fixed effects 
specifications according to Equation (3.2) are presented in Table 3.5. All specifications also 
include controls for time varying characteristics of the head of the household, family 
characteristics, state level characteristics and policies, as well as year dummies. All standard errors 
are clustered at the household level.  
Column (1) of Table 3.5 shows that vehicle values increase by $2,005 after state vehicle 
asset policies are relaxed. The effect is statistically significant at the five percent level, and it is 
highly economically significant as well. The estimated impact of $2,005 for the vehicle policy 
change represents an increase in vehicle value by about 64% over the mean vehicle value of $3,116.   
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Table 3.4 The impact of relaxed SNAP vehicle asset policy on wealth of low educated single 
parents – Difference-in-Differences 






Relaxed Vehicle Asset Policy 1228.4 -2197.2 -2993.7 
 (1369.8) (2608.7) (3248.6) 
    
HH Size: 3 Individuals 675.8 2571.6* -1697.8 
 (778.6) (1358.3) (2395.2) 
    
HH Size: 4+ Individuals  1030.8 1977.1 -1337.8 
 (987.8) (1391.9) (2279.3) 
    
High School Education or GED 2041.7*** 2978.0** 3287.3* 
 (742.4) (1210.6) (1812.2) 
    
Age -2289.1* -3831.9** 7520.4 
 (1247.8) (1752.1) (8076.9) 
    Age-Square 60.00* 104.1** -213.5 
 (32.56) (45.58) (229.6) 
    
Age-Cube -0.479* -0.859** 2.020 
 (0.269) (0.374) (2.087) 
    
Female -2940.7+ -5404.9** -9047.0* 
 (1937.5) (2519.5) (4824.5) 
    
Race: Black -1986.0*** -3144.4*** -9854.0*** 
 (493.1) (1023.1) (2351.8) 
    
Race: Other -1711.6** -3646.0** -6027.4** 
 (759.6) (1520.7) (2473.7) 
    
Reduced Lunch 1057.1 975.7 -1685.5 
 (755.4) (1363.7) (2605.7) 
    
Min. Wage -14839.6 -10756.4 -18528.2 
 (13314.8) (13797.3) (13529.6) 
Household Fixed Effect No No No 
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Family Characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
State-Level Characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
State-Level SNAP Policy Rules Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,522 1,522 1,522 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Estimates use data from the Survey of Income Program Participation (SIPP). Sample includes single 
parents with a high school education or less during the sample period, 2001-2003. State-level 
characteristics include log of TANF and MOE expenditures, unemployment rate, log of manufacturing 
wages, and state vehicle taxes and fees. State-level SNAP policy rules are percentage of FSP benefits 
issued by electronic benefits transfer (EBT) and outreach spending per capita. 
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Table 3.5 The impact of relaxed SNAP vehicle asset policy on car value, car equity, car debt, and 
car ownership of low educated single parents – household fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Car Value Car Equity Car Debt 
Car 
Ownership 
Relaxed Vehicle Asset Policy 2005.0** -735.6 2740.7* 0.0533 
 (933.4) (1099.6) (1442.9) (0.0788) 
     
HH Size: 3 Individuals 354.7 390.5 -35.81 0.0869 
 (1214.2) (914.0) (868.3) (0.111) 
     
HH Size: 4+ Individuals  2005.0 205.5 1799.6 0.203 
 (1507.5) (1114.1) (1493.7) (0.159) 
     
High School Education or GED 2351.0* 314.3 2036.7 0.267 
 (1376.5) (1369.8) (1732.6) (0.369) 
     
Age -4332.1 2134.4 -6466.5 -0.160 
 (4346.7) (4146.3) (6793.3) (0.406) 
     
Age-Square 78.02 -1.244 79.26 0.00584 
 (103.2) (92.39) (141.0) (0.0116) 
     
Age-Cube -0.771 -0.175 -0.596 -0.0000602 
 (0.881) (0.766) (1.187) (0.000107) 
     
Reduced Lunch -1403.2 523.3 -1926.6+ -0.0793 
 (1032.1) (1207.5) (1203.0) (0.0895) 
     
Min. Wage 9490.2** 2273.7 7216.4+ 0.281 
 (3827.1) (3069.0) (4906.9) (0.287) 
Household Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects No No No No 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Family Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Level Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Level SNAP Policy Rules Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 407 407 407 407 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Estimates use data from the Survey of Income Program Participation (SIPP). Sample includes single 
parents with a high school education or less during the sample period, 2001-2003. State-level 
characteristics include log of TANF and MOE expenditures, unemployment rate, log of manufacturing 
wages, and state vehicle taxes and fees. State-level SNAP policy rules are percentage of FSP benefits 





The increase in car value of households does not correspond to an increase in car equity (vehicle 
market value less amount owed on the vehicle). Column (2) of Table 3.5 shows that there is no 
statistically significant impact of the vehicle policy changes on the equity that households hold in 
vehicles. There is a direct accounting relationship between car value, or equity, and debt. If the 
asset value of the car increases, and at the same time there is no impact on vehicle equity, then the 
balance must come from increases in debt. Column (3) presents the results of estimating the impact 
of relaxing vehicle asset polices on the amount of debt on the vehicle. The point estimate ($2,741) 
of the effect is large, and it is precisely estimated at the 10 percent significance level.  
Contrary to the difference-in-difference results presented in Table 3.3, in my household 
fixed effects estimates I find no statistically significant impact of vehicle asset policies on the 
probability that households own a car (Column 4 of Table 3.5). The evidence from Table 3.5 
suggests that households do respond to policy changes by purchasing more expensive vehicles 
when vehicle asset policies are liberalized. Moreover, my results show that households use debt in 
order to purchase the more expensive vehicle. Although low socioeconomic status households are 
likely to be credit constrained, households may still have access to credit markets, especially when 
purchasing vehicles (Aaronson et al. 2012). The point estimates of the impact of vehicle policy 
changes on debt (Table 3.5) suggest that debt on cars increases by a larger amount after vehicle 
policy changes compared to car values. While this result may seem counterintuitive at first, it is 
not uncommon for individuals to have negative equity in their vehicle, particularly after trading in 
one vehicle to buy another (Federal Trade Commission 2012).     
Similar to the difference-in-differences estimates, my household fixed effects 
specifications show that there is no impact of vehicle asset policies on the amount of liquid assets 
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that household hold (Table 3.6). I also find no statistically significant impact of vehicle asset 
policies on non-housing wealth or total wealth of households.  
The results suggesting that households respond to policy changes by purchasing more 
expensive vehicles after vehicle asset policies are liberalized combine the intensive margin and the 
extensive margin. This is because I treated vehicle values as zero when households did not own a 
car. Households that owned a vehicle before the policy change may choose to purchase a more 
expensive vehicle. At the same time, a household that did not own a vehicle prior to the policy 
change may choose to buy a vehicle as a result of the relaxed vehicle asset policy. Sullivan (2006), 
as well as Owens and Baum (2012) found that the probability of vehicle ownership increased as a 
result of relaxing TANF vehicle rules.  
To investigate further, I first estimate car value, car equity, and car debt as a function of 
vehicle asset policy for the subsample of low educated single parents who owned a car before the 
policy change. This reduces the sample size by 50 percent compared to the main results from 
Tables 3.5. Summary statistics for all variables conditional on car ownership before the policy 
change are available in Appendix Table D.4. The results presented in Table 3.7 show that 
individuals who owned a car before the policy change own a car that is worth $2,532 more after 
the policy change (Column 1). This effect is statistically significant at the ten percent level. 
Households also increase their vehicle debt by a statistically significant $3,707 after the policy 
change (Column 3). There is no statistically significant effect of vehicle policy changes on vehicle 
equity. Second, I use the subsample of low educated single parents who did not have a car before 
the policy change and estimate car ownership status as a function of relaxing vehicle asset policies. 
Column (4) of Table 3.7 shows that the point estimate of the impact of the vehicle policy change 
is positive, but not statistically significantly different from zero. I conclude that there is no  
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Table 3.6 The impact of relaxed SNAP vehicle asset policy on wealth of low educated single 
parents – household fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Liquid Assets Non-housing 
Wealth 
Total Wealth 
Relaxed Vehicle Asset Policy 3296.5 -1933.8 -5416.5 
 (2688.0) (5456.8) (5769.5) 
    
HH Size: 3 Individuals 937.6** 2449.7 908.1 
 (459.0) (2878.3) (2800.0) 
    
HH Size: 4+ Individuals  1075.1 155.6 -3310.1 
 (867.4) (3280.1) (3172.1) 
    
High School Education or GED 693.5 -4217.5 -2306.0 
 (1378.8) (7159.0) (6861.7) 
    
Age -6034.4 -5850.1 -224.2 
 (4373.8) (9230.7) (12629.8) 
    
Age-Square 59.25 193.1 195.4 
 (85.91) (260.6) (318.2) 
    
Age-Cube -0.585 -2.167 -2.260 
 (0.727) (2.271) (2.666) 
    
Reduced Lunch -3031.7 2376.8 -64.04 
 (2677.3) (6198.0) (6287.6) 
    
Min. Wage -909.2 1543.9 -14990.3 
 (5866.4) (7921.4) (11636.9) 
Household Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects No No No 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Family Characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
State-Level Characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
State-Level SNAP Policy Rules Yes Yes Yes 
N 407 407 407 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Estimates use data from the Survey of Income Program Participation (SIPP). Sample includes single 
parents with a high school education or less during the sample period, 2001-2003. State-level 
characteristics include log of TANF and MOE expenditures, unemployment rate, log of manufacturing 
wages, and state vehicle taxes and fees. State-level SNAP policy rules are percentage of FSP benefits 





Table 3.7 The impact of relaxed SNAP vehicle asset policy on outcomes of interest: Samples of 
low educated single parents who have a car before the vehicle policy change vs. who do not have 
a car before the vehicle policy change – household fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
 Having a Car  
before the Policy Change 
 Not-having a Car  
before the Policy Change 
 Real Car 
Value 




 Car Ownership 
Relaxed  2531.7* -1176.2 3707.9*  0.159 
   Vehicle Asset Policy (1386.8) (1555.0) (2059.1)  (0.157) 
      
HH Size: 3 Individuals -641.8 382.7 -1024.5  0.0991 
 (1389.1) (1159.2) (848.7)  (0.162) 
      
HH Size: 4+ Individuals  -1955.3 -615.2 -1340.0  0.232 
 (1578.2) (1559.3) (1832.0)  (0.195) 
      
High School Education  1685.0 -409.0 2094.0  0.776*** 
   or GED (1602.8) (2229.7) (3061.0)  (0.225) 
      
Age -6760.3 4066.7 -10827.1  -0.435 
 (5965.9) (6180.3) (9641.6)  (0.451) 
      
Age-Square 107.4 -48.17 155.5  0.0123 
 (142.3) (131.3) (201.8)  (0.0104) 
      
Age-Cube -1.033 0.0620 -1.095  -0.0000979 
 (1.254) (1.057) (1.722)  (0.0000840) 
      
Reduced Lunch -2271.6+ 168.4 -2440.1  -0.00899 
 (1484.1) (1907.2) (1758.5)  (0.0848) 
      
Min. Wage 14760.8*** 5571.0 9189.8  -0.122 
 (4978.3) (4067.0) (6449.8)  (0.429) 
Household Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
State Fixed Effect No No No  No 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Family Characteristics Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
State-Level Char. Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
State-Level SNAP Rules Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
N 233 233 233  174 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Estimates use data from the Survey of Income Program Participation (SIPP). Sample includes single 
parents with a high school education or less during the sample period, 2001-2003. State-level 
characteristics include log of TANF and MOE expenditures, unemployment rate, log of manufacturing 
wages, and state vehicle taxes and fees. State-level SNAP policy rules are percentage of FSP benefits 
issued by electronic benefits transfer (EBT) and outreach spending per capita. 
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evidence to suggest that relaxing vehicle asset policies had an impact on car ownership for low 
educated single parents who did not own a vehicle before the policy change.  
I conclude from Tables 3.5 and 3.7 that the increase in vehicle value and vehicle debt is 
driven by individuals who owned a car before the policy change deciding to purchase a more 
expensive vehicle. This is an intuitive result because it is unlikely that car dependent households 
would prefer having no car over having a car that is worth less than the federal asset limit of $4,650. 
There are several reasons for buying a more expensive car, conditional on already owning one. For 
example, a household may choose to upgrade their vehicle to a more dependent, safer, or lower 
mileage model. To the extent that a more reliable vehicle is related to car dependent households’ 
labor market participation and food security, relaxing vehicle asset policies may be a good thing 
from a policy maker’s perspective. However, households may also choose to upgrade their vehicle 
for other reasons that do not correspond to the policy maker’s objectives.  
Since I have no information regarding the actual vehicle that a household own, it is difficult 
to address this question in this paper. However, it may be possible to gain some insight by 
examining the Blue Book values of vehicles around the sample period. For example, a 1992 
Hyundai Elantra in excellent condition and average mileage was valued at $3,225 in 2000. 
Consumer Reports show that this car had an average reliability rating and an average safety rating.   
This suggests that it was possible for households to have reliable and secure transportation 
to work and to grocery stores with a vehicle valued well below the federal vehicle asset limit of 
$4,650. The estimated increase by around $2,500 after the vehicle policy change means that by 
2002 households could have upgraded to a Toyota Corolla, which is also eight years old, but has 
a superior safety rating and superior reliability rating.69  
                                                          
69 For the comparison of those two used cars (Elantra vs. Corolla), I use recently produced used cars, instead of the 
used cars made in 1990s, due to the limited information in Consumer Reports.  
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Households that receive Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) or 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) are categorically eligible for SNAP, and any changes to the 
asset rules related to SNAP do not apply to these households. 70  In order words, they are 
automatically eligible for SNAP without vehicle asset tests. Therefore, the results presented above 
should not be driven by households that receive TANF benefits. Accordingly, I estimate 
specifications that exclude households that ever received TANF benefits during the sample period 
because TANF recipients are categorically eligible for SNAP and the SNAP asset test does not 
apply. 
Table 3.8 shows the results of estimating Equation (3.2) including all controls for the 
subsample of households that have never received TANF benefits during the sample period. The 
size of the sample is reduced, and the models were estimated with a sample size of 299 
observations. Similar to results from the sample of all single parents with at most a high school 
diploma, I find that relaxing vehicle asset policy affects car market value and debt for those single 
parents with at most a high school diploma who never received TANF benefits. Car equity, car 
ownership, liquid assets, and non-housing wealth are not affected by state vehicle asset policies. 
Real vehicle value increases by $3,807 as a result of the policy changes. This effect is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level, and the point estimate is larger compared to the sample of all 
single parents.  
As an additional robustness check, I estimate specifications according to Equation (3.2) for 
households that have a significantly lower ex-ante probability of receiving SNAP benefits. I 
estimated all regression using a sample of individuals with at most a high school education who 
do not have any children. Despite the similar education level, only around 15 percent of individuals  
                                                          
70 This is not the same as broad-based categorical eligibility. TANF recipients have also been categorically eligible 
for SNAP benefits prior to any state-level policy changes.  
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Table 3.8 The impact of relaxed SNAP vehicle asset policy on all outcomes of interest sample of 
low educated single parents who never receive tanf – household fixed effects 















Relaxed  3807.0*** -224.4 4031.4* 0.121 5022.8 -2106.9 
  Vehicle Asset Pol. (1244.6) (1568.7) (2161.2) (0.0927) (3992.4) (8264.8) 
       
HH Size:  751.2 721.0 30.24 0.213* 616.7 5364.2 
  3 Individuals (1469.3) (1237.3) (980.1) (0.125) (763.4) (3960.8) 
       
HH Size:  3046.1* -141.3 3187.3* 0.389** 1648.4 378.8 
  4+ Individuals (1743.0) (1490.3) (1840.9) (0.175) (1293.5) (4677.6) 
       
High School  2497.9* 31.18 2466.7 0.305 1523.3 -9633.7 
  Education (1324.9) (2049.4) (2595.4) (0.340) (2267.3) (11800.3) 
       
Age -4660.4 5597.9 -10258.3 -0.440 -8731.7 -2689.4 
 (5012.3) (6556.7) (8708.9) (0.493) (6328.0) (12994.7) 
       
Age-Square 53.96 -90.43 144.4 0.0115 79.57 134.7 
 (116.0) (141.8) (168.6) (0.0135) (122.5) (331.4) 
       
Age-Cube -0.659 0.440 -1.099 -0.000111 -0.756 -1.838 
 (0.962) (1.084) (1.339) (0.000120) (0.986) (2.796) 
       
Reduced Lunch -1760.9 669.1 -2430.0* -0.162* -3724.9 3299.3 
 (1219.7) (1390.1) (1423.9) (0.0862) (3312.5) (8014.6) 
       
Min. Wage 13501.2** 4180.5 9320.7 0.276 -3534.1 -305.0 
 (5275.2) (4428.8) (6658.2) (0.280) (10588.3) (13908.9) 
HH Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effect No No No No No No 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Family Char.  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Level Char. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Level  
  SNAP Policy Rules 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 299 299 299 299 299 299 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Estimates use data from the Survey of Income Program Participation (SIPP). State-level characteristics 
include log of TANF and MOE expenditures, unemployment rate, log of manufacturing wages, and state 
vehicle taxes and fees. State-level SNAP policy rules are percentage of FSP benefits issued by electronic 




without children received food stamps, compared to 45 percent of single parents. Therefore, 
individuals without children are less likely to be affect by the vehicle policy changes. Singles 
without children own similar valued vehicles to ones of single parents, but have higher car equity. 
Real car equity of single individuals without children is around $2,200, compared to $1,500 of 
single parents. 
Table 3.9 shows that vehicle policy changes do not affect the value of vehicles, vehicle 
equity, vehicle debt, or the probability of having a car for single individuals without children.71 
The point estimates are smaller compared to the point estimates from the specifications using 
single parents, and the standard errors are large. The number of observations is also larger for the 
sample of household of individuals without children compared to the households headed by single 
parents. Therefore, I conclude that the statistical insignificance of the results is not driven by 
smaller sample size. 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, I used data from single parents with low education obtained from the Survey 
of Income and Program Participation to examine the effects of state vehicle asset rules on vehicle 
assets and debts, car ownership, liquid assets holdings, as well as non-housing wealth. I used a 
difference-in-differences specification, as well as a fixed effects estimator that exploits within-
household variations in the timing of state vehicle asset policy changes to identify the effect of 
state vehicle asset rules on the outcomes of interest.  
Liberalizing vehicle asset rules results in a significant increase in the value of households’ 
vehicles. In particular, after the vehicle asset policy is relaxed, households own cars that are around  
                                                          
71 Since this sample consists of non-married individuals without children, I do not control for family size or children 
receiving reduced lunch in any of the specifications.    
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Table 3.9 The impact of relaxed SNAP vehicle asset policy on all outcomes of interest.  
low educated individuals without children – household fixed effects 















Relaxed  -93.12 -391.4 298.3 0.0188 -3592.0 44471.3 
  Vehicle Asset Pol. (949.3) (967.7) (1554.6) (0.0658) (5639.7) (34843.9) 
       
High School  547.7 -4474.6 5022.4 0.0199 -1829.0 -1834.6 
  Education (440.2) (3598.2) (3862.4) (0.0369) (5537.4) (15837.7) 
       
Age -558.8 588.4 -1147.2 -0.309 3366.4 -77104.5+ 
 (2287.9) (3001.9) (3442.4) (0.260) (20291.3) (52491.9) 
       
Age-Square 4.138 -6.841 10.98 0.00590 -226.8 641.6 
 (46.03) (70.41) (77.79) (0.00526) (570.6) (998.0) 
       
Age-Cube 0.0331 0.0115 0.0216 -0.0000372 2.637 -3.382 
 (0.348) (0.545) (0.587) (0.0000387) (5.316) (8.109) 
       
Min. Wage -1185.7 1588.3 -2774.0 -0.0910 -11934.0 44835.0 
 (2749.2) (2776.3) (3676.9) (0.195) (23822.3) (46377.8) 
HH Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effect No No No No No No 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Family Char. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Level     
   Char. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Level  
  SNAP Policy Rules 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 555 555 555 555 555 555 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01. Estimates use data from the Survey of Income Program Participation (SIPP). State-level 
characteristics include log of TANF and MOE expenditures, unemployment rate, log of manufacturing 
wages, and state vehicle taxes and fees. State-level SNAP policy rules are percentage of FSP benefits 
issued by electronic benefits transfer (EBT) and outreach spending per capita. 
 
$2,000 more expensive compared to the time prior to the policy change. This increase corresponds 
to an increase in vehicle asset by 64 percent at the mean. I find evidence to suggest that households 
use credit in order to finance the more expensive car. I also find evidence that the increase in 
vehicle market values after SNAP vehicle policies are relaxed stems from households who already 
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owned a car before the policy change buying a more expensive vehicle. There is no impact of the 
vehicle asset policy changes on the propensity of households to own a car. Liberalizing vehicle 
asset rules has no impact on liquid asset holdings and no impact on non-housing wealth. 
The results of this paper contribute to the literature on the effects of asset tests used to 
determine eligibility for social assistance programs. This paper is the first to analyze the impact of 
vehicle asset rules in the SNAP program. The literature does not agree about the effect of vehicle 
asset policies in other social assistance programs, and I provide additional evidence suggesting 
that individuals do respond to liberalized asset policies.  
Since I observe only the fair market value and debt associated with households’ vehicles, 
but not the actual vehicle owned by the households, it is difficult to assess whether the effect of 
the vehicle asset policy changes is desirable from a policy maker’s perspective. The increase in 
vehicle values and debt I report here may be the result of households upgrading their vehicles to 
more dependable and safer models, which has the potential to improve labor market outcomes and 
food security. However, the current data do not allow us to test this hypothesis directly, and further 












CHAPTER 4. THE IMPACT OF AIR QUALITY NOTIFICATIONS ON INFANT 
HEALTH: EVIDENCE FROM KOREA  
 
4.1 Introduction 
It has been documented that health at birth, specifically birth weight, has long term effects. 
For example, Currie (2011) and the papers she cites show that infants with higher birth weights 
are taller, have greater IQ scores, attain higher education levels and earn more when they are adults. 
Because of birth weight’s importance in shaping future outcomes, it is important from both 
scientific and public policy perspectives to investigate its determinants (Almond and Currie 2011). 
In this paper, I focus on the impact of air quality and the effectiveness of public air quality warnings 
on infant health.  
The Asian yellow sand (called Hwang-sa in Korean) is a weather phenomenon, that is 
generated in the arid lands of northern China and the desert regions of Mongolia plateau “under 
the conditions of high temperature, low humidity, and high wind velocity” (Chun et al. 2001). 
Winds with abnormally high speed, particularly the Westerlies,72 pick up dust and sand particles 
and carry them towards the Korean peninsula. Then, these particles of dust and sand gradually 
settle in Korea’s territory, and this event is called a yellow sand outbreak (event). The events occur 
“most frequently during spring from March to May, but irregularly during winter” (Chun et al. 
2001). Summer (called monsoon season in Korea) has no Asian dust due to heavy rainfalls. Figure 
4.1 displays the average daily particulate matter levels (PM10, a proxy of yellow dust) by month 
and illustrates this phenomenon.73 
                                                          
72 The Westerlies, winds blowing from the west to the east, occur in “the temperate zones, in the middle latitudes 
between 30 and 60 degrees latitude, in the Earth.”  




Figure 4.1 Average daily PM10 concentrations in my sample between years 2003 and 2011  
 
The dust and sand particles carried to Korea by winds are believed to harm human health 
and to cause adverse respiratory health effects, particularly in children and the elderly (Ministry 
of Environment of Korea 2002). Dust concentrations are more harmful to pregnant women who 
are likely to retain a lower level of immunity (National broadcast newspaper in Korea 2011). 
Epidemiological literature has also found negative health consequences of yellow sand (Park et al. 
2005; Lee et al. 2007).  
Due to these detrimental effects, in order to reduce the risk of dust exposure, Korea has 
developed a warning system with behavioral guidelines. Since 2002, Korean Meteorological 
Administration (KMA) releases notifications to the public based on the PM10 levels. In the areas 
that are affected by yellow sand events, concentration of PM10 is elevated. An advisory and a 
warning is issued when PM10 level rise above 400 and 800 𝜇𝑚/m3 for over 2 hours in a day, 
respectively. These public notifications advise individuals, especially children, the elderly, and 









































staying indoors is recommended. Pregnant women are suggested to refrain from outdoor activities 
and to wear protective masks if necessary. Individuals do follow these behavioral guidelines. For 
example, in 2002, in response to high density yellow dust, elementary schools are closed, and 
plants in some industries, such as semiconductor manufacturing temporarily are shut down (KMA). 
Using data obtained from about 1.5 million birth certificates of infants born between 2003 
and 2011 in Korea, I investigate the effect of dust notifications issued by the KMA on birth weight. 
The mechanisms through which these notifications may affect birth outcomes are twofold. First, 
when a notice is issued, if pregnant women comply with the advisory by staying indoors, they 
avoid exposure to the pollutants. Therefore, their babies are born healthier. Consider the following 
hypothetical example of two identical pregnant women Annie and Barbie who live in cities A and 
B, respectively. A yellow dust event hits both cities, increasing PM10 levels to 400 and 399 𝜇𝑚/m3 
in cities A and B, respectively. Because of the warning issue rule mentioned above, city A warns 
its residents, while city B does not. Consequently, unlike Barbie, Annie takes precautionary action 
by staying indoors and avoids exposure to elevated levels of pollution. Therefore, Annie’s baby is 
more likely to be born healthier compared to Barbie’s baby. 
The second mechanism involves an unintended consequence of the dust warnings. 
Specifically, the warnings may reduce the risk that a pregnant woman catches infectious diseases 
such as the flu which influences infant health negatively (Rasmussen, Jamieson and Uyeki 2012). 
During a yellow sand outbreak, when a warning is issued, Koreans respond by wearing preventive 
masks. This is documented in the popular media.74 Such masks not only provide protection against 
the dust, but also against airborne infectious diseases (Cowling et al. 2009; MacIntyre et al. 2008). 
Similarly, if individuals stay indoors more, when a dust warning is issued, in effect, they isolate 
                                                          




themselves and become less likely to get infected or spread diseases. When the majority of the 
population undertakes such preventive actions, even the individuals who do not protect themselves 
are likely to be protected. This positive externality is known as the Community (or Herd) Effect in 
the epidemiology literature (John and Samuel 2000).75 Thus, mothers who have experienced more 
dust warnings are less likely to catch infectious diseases, and their babies are less likely to suffer 
negative consequences of these diseases. 
This paper is the first to investigate the effectiveness of public air quality warnings on birth 
outcomes. Previous papers by Moretti and Neidell (2011), Neidell (2009) and Neidell (2004) also 
consider public warnings, but these papers focus on smug alerts’ effect on respiratory illnesses 
such as the asthma in general population, rather than birth outcomes. Additionally, in this paper, I 
exploit a natural experiment to estimate the effect of air quality warnings. Yellow sand storms 
occur naturally and are blown mostly in the spring from northern China and Mongolia. The 
deterioration in air quality due to these exogenous storms gives rise to public warnings. Thus, the 
identification of the effect of air quality warnings comes from the exogenous geographical and 
temporal variation in pregnant women’s experience of dust notifications.  
Controlling for the air quality during pregnancy (measured by the average exposure to 
PM10), I find that dust notifications have statistically significant effect on fetal health. If a pregnant 
mother experiences an additional advisory or a warning during her pregnancy, her baby’s birth 
weight increases by about 10 grams. I also provide evidence for an unintended consequence of 
these notifications. Specifically, I show that a baby is more likely to be born with lower weight if 
their mother’s risk of catching an infectious disease, particularly the flu, during pregnancy is higher. 
However, the detrimental effect of the flu on newborns’ health gets smaller if their mothers 
                                                          
75  Herd Effect is defined as the indirect protection observed in the unprotected or unimmunized segment of a 
population in which a large proportion is immunized or protected (John and Samuel 2000). 
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experienced air quality notifications. My findings are robust to inclusion of weather controls. 
Taken together, my results provide evidence for the effectiveness of warning systems in promoting 
public health. My results also underline the importance of taking into account individual’s 
avoidance behavior when estimating the impact of air quality on birth outcomes, a confounding 
factor which is not explicitly taken into consideration when estimating the effect of pollution on 
infant health. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 4.2, I provide an empirical 
specification. Section 4.3 describes data construction and section 4.4 presents the estimated results. 
Section 4.5 concludes. 
4.2 Empirical specification 
In order to investigate the role of the dust notifications on infant health outcomes, I estimate 
the equation depicted below: 
(4.1)  𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑃𝑀10𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛾𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝜌 + 𝜇𝑐 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑐𝑡 
where 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑡 indicates birth outcomes of an infant 𝑖 born to a mother residing in region 𝑐 at 
time 𝑡. I consider four outcome variables: a continuous measure of birth weight, a binary indicator 
of low birth weight (indicating whether the infant’s birth weight is less than 2,500 grams), gestation 
weeks and fetal growth (birth weight per gestation week).76 𝑃𝑀10𝑖𝑐𝑡  measures the air quality. 
Specifically, 𝑃𝑀10𝑖𝑐𝑡 is the average hourly PM10 to which infant 𝑖’s mother is exposed during 
her pregnancy. 𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 stands for the number of days the mother experienced an advisory or a 
warning in her pregnancy. Because the exposure to pollution in different developmental stages of 
the fetus may have differential impact on birth outcomes, in another specification, I use the 
                                                          
76 Studies, such as Coneus and Spiess (2012), also used fetal growth as a birth outcome measure.   
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exposure of mothers to PM10 and notices in each trimester of pregnancy instead of their exposure 
during the whole pregnancy. 
𝑋 in Equation (4.1) is a vector of control variables that include parental characteristics, 
such as both parent’s age, education, marital status and employment status. Omission of such 
variables could bias my estimates. For example, it is possible that mothers who have certain 
attributes (such as more education or more experience) could be more aware of the potential 
negative health effects of yellow sand. If these mothers time their pregnancy to avoid the months 
in which there are frequent yellow sand outbreaks or when the density of the dust is high, and if 
these educated mothers have babies with higher birth weights due to better nutrition, etc., then I 
might incorrectly attribute a difference in birth weight between highly-educated and low-educated 
mothers to air quality or dust warnings, when in fact part of the difference might be due to the 
mother’s education. Similarly, family affluence can determine infant health (Currie 2011), so it is 
important to control for family income level. In this paper, I use parental education and 
employment status as proxies of family income, as the income itself is not available in the data 
source.77  
Vector 𝑋 also contains variables that are believed to have an effect on infant birth weight 
(Currie 2011). Such variables include infant’s gender, an indicator of whether the infant was part 
of a multiple birth and birth parity. In the regressions, I include indicators for the region of 
residence, 𝜇𝑐, to account for unobserved time-invariant characteristics of the regions. For example, 
there could be a disparity in economic development across regions, and the more urbanized areas 
are likely to have greater access to health care. Equation (4.1) also contains a vector of year 
dummies, 𝜃𝑡. Standard errors in all specifications are clustered at the city level.  
                                                          




My data set is composed of two different data sets: 1) Korean birth certificates and 2) 
Hourly PM10 observations. Korean birth certificates data are obtained from Vital Statistics-
Natality Files provided by Statistics Korea Micro Data Service System. These files cover all of 
birth certificates issued across Korea. The birth certificate data set contains infant-level variables 
such as gender, birth weight, gestational length, whether the infant was singleton, and birth order, 
as well as parental demographics such as age, education level, employment status, and marital 
status. Following Knittel, Miller, and Sanders (2011), I restrict my sample to infants whose 
gestational age is between 27 and 42 weeks in order to sufficiently determine three trimesters.  
PM10 data are obtained from National Institute of Environmental Research (NIER) in 
Korea. Hourly PM10 measure is available at the monitor station level. Some districts contain 
multiple monitor stations, and in total there are roughly 250 such weather stations across Korea. 
In case of multiple monitoring stations in a region, I used the average of their measures. I calculated 
the average hourly PM10 exposure of every mother during their pregnancy according to their city 
of residence, gestation length and their baby’s date of birth listed in the birth certificates.78 My 
measure of air pollution is the average hourly PM10 concentration in the city of residence of the 
mother during her pregnancy. Figure 4.2 shows the average daily PM10 concentrations in each 
region across Korea between years 2003 and 2011 in my sample. 79  As shown, the PM10 
concentration is relatively higher in the northeast, close to northern China and the Mongolia 
                                                          
78 The birth certificates data set only includes month and year of birth, but not day of birth. In my analysis, I assumed 
that infants are born on the 15th day of the month reported in the certificate. I were also unable to identify children 
born from the same mother and twins as the birth certificate data set does not include mother’s name and residential 
street address. 
79 Although PM10 concentrations are available at the weather station level in a region, for eight regions (Seoul, Busan, 
Daegu, Incheon, Gwangju, Daejeon, Ulsan, and Gyeonggi-do) I report the average PM10 levels in a region in this 
map due to the lack of space.  
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plateau. For example, it was 58.6 𝜇𝑚/𝑚3 in Seoul between 2003 and 2011, whereas Geoje-si, the 
most southeastern region used in my sample, had 36.3 Geoje-si 𝜇𝑚/𝑚3. 
 
Figure 4.2 Average daily PM10 concentrations in each region across Korea  
between years 2003 and 2011 
 
Since 2002, the KMA has been issuing advisories and warnings to the residents based on 
the PM10 levels in the area. These notices provide information to the residents and advise them to 
take protective action against air pollution. The thresholds of PM10 above which advisories and 
warnings are issued are 400 and 800 𝜇𝑚/𝑚3 for two consecutive hours, respectively. To construct 
my measure of advisories and warnings, I counted the number of pregnancy days in which 
observed PM10 level was greater than 400 and 800 𝜇𝑚/𝑚3 for at least two hours. That is, the 
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variables Advisory and Warning denotes the number of corresponding notices by the KMA a 
mother experiences during her pregnancy.  
My final data set is composed of about 1.5 million infants born to mothers in Korea 
between 2003 and 2011.80 The descriptions and the summary statistics of the variables I use in my 
analysis are presented in Table 4.1. The average Korean infant was born just above 3,200 grams 
with gestational age of 39 weeks. Approximately, five percent of Korean infants weighed less than 
2,500 grams at birth. An average Korean mother is not employed, is in her late 20s or early 30s, 
and she has a college degree or more. She is also married. An average Korean father is employed, 
in his early to mid 30s with a college degree or more. A comparison of Korean infants’ 
characteristics to those of American infants born in New Jersey reveals that the incidence of low 
birth weight is about twice as much in New Jersey compared to Korea (Currie et al. 2009). This 
difference could be partially due to the difference in parents’ education levels: the average 
American mother has a high school diploma.  
Average hourly PM10 exposure of a mother in my sample is about 56 𝜇𝑚/𝑚3. Due to 
yellow dust breaks, mothers experienced 1.1 advisories and 0.46 warnings during their pregnancies  
(issued when PM levels greater than 400 and 800 𝜇𝑚/𝑚3for two consecutive hours during a day, 
respectively). Number of advisories (warnings) during pregnancy ranges between 0 and 7 (0 and 
3) in my sample. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 depict the total numbers of advisories and warnings in all 123 
regions in my sample between years 2003 and 2011, and they show similar patterns to Figure 4.1. 
 
 
                                                          
80 My sample starts from 2003 since dust alert systems have been established during the middle of the year 2002. In 
the data set I obtained from the Statistics Korea, there are about 4 million birth certificates between 2003 and 2011. 
However, I lose observations since the PM10 data is not available for some Korean cities. 
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Table 4.1 Descriptions and summary statistics for Korean babies born between 2003 and 2011 
Variable Description Mean (SD) 
Outcome variables    
Birth Weight Birth weight of the infant in grams 3,233.30 (454.36) 
Low Birth Weight =1 if birth weight is less than 2,500 grams 0.05 (0.21) 
Gestation Gestational age of the infant in weeks 38.85 (1.59) 
Fetal Growth Birth weight/Gestation 83.11 (10.63) 
    
Air quality and Notice variables 
Advisory Number of pregnancy days in which PM10 
levels were above 400 two consecutive hours 
1.10 (1.26) 
Warning Number of pregnancy days in which PM10 
levels were above 800 two consecutive hours 
0.46 (0.74) 
PM10 Average hourly PM10 exposure during 
pregnancy 
55.62 (9.33) 
    
Infant variables    
Singleton =1 if the infant is singleton (as opposed to twin 
or triplet) 
0.97 (0.16) 
Girl =1 if the infant is a girl 0.48 (0.50) 
Birth order 2 =1 if the infant is the second child to a mother 0.39 (0.49) 
Birth order 3+ =1 if the infant is the third  child to a mother or 
higher 
0.09 (0.29) 
    
Parent variables    
Married =1 if the parents of the infant are married 0.99 (0.09) 
Mother working =1 if mother is employed 0.28 (0.45) 
Mother's age 20-29 =1 if mother's age is between 20 and 29 0.41 (0.49) 
Mother's age 30-39 =1 if mother's age is between 30 and 39 0.57 (0.50) 
Mother's age 40+ =1 if mother's age is at least 40 0.02 (0.12) 
Mother HS =1 if the mother's highest completed degree is 
high school 
0.35 (0.48) 
Mother College =1 if the mother's highest completed degree is 
college or more 
0.63 (0.48) 
Father working =1 if father is employed 0.96 (0.20) 
Father's age 20-29 =1 if father's age is between 20 and 29 0.19 (0.39) 
Father's age 30-39 =1 if father's age is between 30 and 39 0.74 (0.44) 
Father's age 40+ =1 if father's age is at least 40 0.07 (0.25) 
Father HS =1 if the father's highest completed degree is 
high school 
0.31 (0.46) 
Father College =1 if the father's highest completed degree is 
college or more 
0.67 (0.47) 




Note: Figure illustrates the total number of advisories in all 123 cities in my sample between years 2003 
and 2011. 





Note: Figure illustrates the total number of warnings in all 123 cities in my sample between years 2003 
and 2011. 












































































Results obtained from estimation of Equation (4.1) are presented in Table 4.2. In addition 
to the variables listed, all regressions include city and year fixed effects. Outcome variables are 
the birth weight in grams (column 1), and indicator for whether the birth weight is less than 2,500 
grams (column 2), gestational age in weeks (column 3), and ratio of birth weight to gestational age 
in grams per week (column 4). Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the city 
level.  
Column 1 in Table 4.2 shows that babies of the mothers who were exposed to worse air 
quality during their pregnancy are born with lower weights. Specifically, a one 𝜇𝑚/𝑚3 increase 
in the average exposure to PM10 during pregnancy leads to about 1 gram reduction in the 
newborn’s birth weight. This implies a 10 percent increase in the average hourly PM10 exposure 
reduces birth weight by about 0.2% (from the baseline of 3,200 grams). Column 1 also indicates 
that each additional advisory and warning that mother experiences during her pregnancy improves 
birth weight by 10 and 14 grams, respectively. These effects are statistically different from zero. 
A warning’s effect is larger than an advisory’s effect. The p-value for the equality of coefficients 
is less than 0.01. This could be because a warning signals greater dust levels and greater risk than 
an advisory, and therefore a warning may prompt a greater response.  
Advisories and warnings are issued based on the measurements of PM10. Specifically, 
when there is a spike of pollutants for two hours during one day, an advisory or warning is issued. 
Notice that a spike in PM10 concentrations during two hours has a minimal effect on the average 
PM10 exposure during pregnancy (typically 39 weeks). For example, during a yellow dust event, 
if PM10 levels increased to 400 𝜇𝑚/𝑚3 for two hours, the average hourly exposure will increase 
to 56.11 𝜇𝑚/𝑚3 from 56 𝜇𝑚/𝑚3. According to my estimates in column 1, such a change in the  
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Table 4.2 The effect of dust notifications on infant health 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Birth Weight Low Birth Weight Gestational Age Fetal Growth 
Advisories 9.913*** -0.004*** 0.076*** 0.113*** 
 (0.700) (0.000) (0.005) (0.012) 
Warnings 14.037*** -0.006*** 0.106*** 0.164*** 
 (1.446) (0.001) (0.008) (0.027) 
PM10 -0.943*** 0.000*** -0.006*** -0.012*** 
 (0.136) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) 
Singleton 844.850*** -0.491*** 2.836*** 17.103*** 
 (5.026) (0.004) (0.025) (0.100) 
Girl -96.495*** 0.009*** 0.137*** -2.765*** 
 (0.672) (0.000) (0.003) (0.015) 
Birth Order 2nd  27.760*** -0.009*** -0.394*** 1.581*** 
 (1.236) (0.000) (0.004) (0.029) 
Birth Order 3+ 57.712*** -0.011*** -0.396*** 2.353*** 
 (1.966) (0.001) (0.006) (0.048) 
Married 32.477*** -0.014*** 0.120*** 0.611*** 
 (4.784) (0.002) (0.015) (0.115) 
Mother employed 5.911*** 0.000 -0.002 0.151*** 
 (1.041) (0.000) (0.003) (0.025) 
Mother’s Age 20-29 62.534*** -0.008** 0.057** 1.478*** 
 (5.960) (0.003) (0.023) (0.140) 
Mother’s Age 30-39 60.916*** -0.001 -0.025 1.589*** 
 (5.904) (0.003) (0.023) (0.141) 
Mother’s Age 40+ 17.866** 0.019*** -0.289*** 0.997*** 
 (6.830) (0.004) (0.027) (0.166) 
Mother HS 43.073*** -0.010*** 0.045*** 1.022*** 
 (3.361) (0.002) (0.013) (0.078) 
Mother College 49.545*** -0.015*** 0.108*** 1.070*** 
 (3.457) (0.002) (0.013) (0.080) 
Father employed 10.228*** -0.005*** 0.008 0.268*** 
 (1.724) (0.001) (0.007) (0.038) 
Father’s Age 20-29 20.831 -0.004 0.045 0.474 
 (12.742) (0.007) (0.048) (0.310) 
Father’s Age 30-39 22.673* -0.004 0.046 0.518 
 (12.983) (0.007) (0.047) (0.318) 
Father’s Age 40+ 11.855 0.003 -0.041 0.403 
 (12.714) (0.007) (0.047) (0.310) 
Father HS 20.278*** -0.007*** 0.027** 0.470*** 
 (3.256) (0.001) (0.011) (0.076) 
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Table 4.2 continued 
Father College 26.175*** -0.012*** 0.081*** 0.518*** 
 (3.318) (0.001) (0.011) (0.080) 
Observations 1,472,978 1,472,978 1,472,978 1,472,978 
Notes: Outcome variables are the birth weight in grams (1), and indicator for whether the birth weight is 
less than 2,500 grams (2), gestational age in weeks (3), and ratio of birth weight to gestational age in grams 
per week (4). Regressions include indicators for cities and years. Standard errors reported in parentheses 
are clustered at the city level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
PM10 levels will reduce the baby’s birth weight by about 0.11 grams. However, because an 
advisory is issued, baby’s birth weight will improve by about 10 grams. The net effect of the rise 
in PM10 levels on birth weight will be an increase of 9.9 grams. My results suggest that the effect 
of a smaller spike of PM10 is detrimental, because it does not trigger an advisory. For example, 
an increase of PM10 levels to 350 𝜇𝑚/𝑚3for two hours will raise the average hourly PM10 
exposure to 56.09 𝜇𝑚/𝑚3, which will reduce the birth weight by about 0.09 grams.  
Similar to those in column 1, results presented in columns 2 to 4 in Table 4.2 provide 
evidence for a negative effect of average PM10 exposure and a positive effect of notifications on 
birth outcomes. Each additional advisory and warning that a pregnant woman experiences reduces 
the probability of low birth weight by 0.4 and 0.6 percentage points (from the baseline of 5 
percentage points). More advisories and warnings increase the gestational age and average fetal 
growth, while PM10 exposure reduces them. 
The signs of the control variables in Table 4.2 are as expected. Girls, twins or triplets and 
babies born to mothers who have not previously given birth weigh less at birth compared to boys, 
singletons and babies born to mothers who have given birth to at least one baby, respectively. 
Prime age for best birth outcomes are 20s for mothers and 30s for fathers. Babies whose parents 
are employed and have attained higher education levels are born healthier.  
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Previous papers have provided evidence for differential effect on the birth outcomes of 
external factors in different developmental stages of a fetus (Currie 2011). To investigate this 
possibility, in the regressions, I include exposure to PM10 and number of notices against poor air 
quality in first, second and third trimesters, instead of the overall exposure during the whole 
pregnancy. For example, instead of the variable Advisories, I include Advisories – trimester 1, 
Advisories – trimester 2 and Advisories – trimester 3 that measure the number of advisories a 
pregnant women has experienced during her first, second and third trimesters, respectively.  
The results presented in Table 4.3 are similar to those in Table 4.2. Number of advisories 
experienced in any trimester has a positive and significant impact on the birth weight. These effects 
are not statistically different from each other. While the effect of warnings in the first trimester is 
not statistically different from zero, the warnings in the second and third trimesters improve birth  
Table 4.3 The effect of dust notifications on infant health in trimesters 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Birth Weight Low Birth Weight Gestational Age Fetal Growth 
Advisories – trimester 1 9.905*** -0.004*** 0.078*** 0.111*** 
 (0.865) (0.000) (0.005) (0.017) 
Advisories – trimester 2 11.844*** -0.005*** 0.080*** 0.158*** 
 (1.113) (0.000) (0.007) (0.018) 
Advisories – trimester 3 12.115*** -0.004*** 0.087*** 0.145*** 
 (0.856) (0.000) (0.005) (0.016) 
Warnings – trimester 1 -0.076 -0.000 0.004 -0.010 
 (1.712) (0.001) (0.008) (0.034) 
Warnings – trimester 2 6.871*** -0.002*** 0.038*** 0.109*** 
 (1.374) (0.001) (0.007) (0.029) 
Warnings – trimester 3 3.576** -0.002*** 0.037*** 0.026 
 (1.507) (0.001) (0.008) (0.032) 
PM10 – trimester 1 -0.128** 0.000*** -0.002*** -0.000 
 (0.058) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
PM10 – trimester 2 -0.742*** 0.000*** -0.003*** -0.013*** 
 (0.061) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
PM10 – trimester 3 0.089 0.000 -0.001* 0.004*** 
 (0.064) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
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Table 4.3 continued     
Singleton 844.679*** -0.491*** 2.835*** 17.100*** 
 (5.027) (0.004) (0.025) (0.100) 
Girl -96.501*** 0.009*** 0.137*** -2.765*** 
 (0.671) (0.000) (0.003) (0.015) 
Birth Order 2nd  27.651*** -0.009*** -0.395*** 1.579*** 
 (1.237) (0.000) (0.004) (0.029) 
Birth Order 3+ 57.689*** -0.011*** -0.397*** 2.353*** 
 (1.968) (0.001) (0.006) (0.048) 
Married 32.424*** -0.014*** 0.119*** 0.610*** 
 (4.766) (0.002) (0.015) (0.115) 
Mother employed 6.050*** 0.000 -0.001 0.153*** 
 (1.039) (0.000) (0.003) (0.025) 
Mother’s Age 20-29 62.393*** -0.008** 0.057** 1.475*** 
 (5.954) (0.003) (0.023) (0.139) 
Mother’s Age 30-39 60.819*** -0.001 -0.025 1.587*** 
 (5.902) (0.003) (0.023) (0.141) 
Mother’s Age 40+ 17.868*** 0.019*** -0.289*** 0.997*** 
 (6.826) (0.004) (0.026) (0.166) 
Mother HS 43.053*** -0.010*** 0.045*** 1.022*** 
 (3.365) (0.002) (0.013) (0.078) 
Mother College 49.581*** -0.015*** 0.108*** 1.070*** 
 (3.460) (0.002) (0.013) (0.080) 
Father employed 10.342*** -0.005*** 0.009 0.270*** 
 (1.715) (0.001) (0.007) (0.038) 
Father’s Age 20-29 20.802 -0.004 0.045 0.473 
 (12.734) (0.007) (0.047) (0.310) 
Father’s Age 30-39 22.602* -0.004 0.046 0.516 
 (12.975) (0.007) (0.047) (0.318) 
Father’s Age 40+ 11.866 0.003 -0.041 0.403 
 (12.705) (0.007) (0.047) (0.310) 
Father HS 20.328*** -0.007*** 0.027** 0.471*** 
 (3.255) (0.001) (0.011) (0.076) 
Father College 26.218*** -0.012*** 0.081*** 0.519*** 
 (3.316) (0.001) (0.011) (0.080) 
Observations 1,472,978 1,472,978 1,472,978 1,472,978 
Notes: Outcome variables are the birth weight in grams (1), an indicator for whether the birth weight is less 
than 2,500 grams (2), gestational age in weeks (3), and ratio of birth weight to gestational age in grams per 
week (4). trimester 1, trimester 2 and trimester 3 variables indicate the number of advisories, warnings and 
average PM10 level during trimesters 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Regressions include indicators for cities and 
years. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the city level. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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outcomes significantly. Average PM10 exposure in early stages of pregnancy (first and second 
trimesters) has a negative impact on the birth outcomes. 
Samet et al. (1998) and Deschênes and Moretti (2009) show that weather conditions 
influence newborns’ health outcomes. If weather conditions also have an effect on air quality and 
dust warnings, omission of weather controls will bias my estimates (Currie et al. 2009; Lleras-
Muney 2010; Moretti and Neidell 2011). To avoid the potentially confounding effect of weather 
conditions, in the regressions, I include Average Temperature and Average Precipitation during 
the mother’s pregnancy. Results presented in Table 4.4 suggest that my findings are not sensitive 
to inclusion of weather variables.  
Table 4.4 The effect of air dust notifications on infant health (with weather controls) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Birth Weight Low Birth Weight Gestational Age Fetal Growth 
Advisories 10.419*** -0.004*** 0.076*** 0.127*** 
 (0.827) (0.000) (0.006) (0.014) 
Warnings 14.329*** -0.006*** 0.106*** 0.174*** 
 (1.664) (0.001) (0.010) (0.032) 
PM10 -1.113*** 0.000*** -0.007*** -0.016*** 
 (0.191) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) 
Average Temperature -0.599** 0.001*** -0.004** -0.010* 
 (0.281) (0.000) (0.002) (0.006) 
Average Precipitation -0.045** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001** 
 (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Singleton 842.156*** -0.491*** 2.827*** 17.042*** 
 (6.106) (0.005) (0.029) (0.120) 
Girl -96.797*** 0.009*** 0.137*** -2.772*** 
 (0.809) (0.000) (0.003) (0.018) 
Birth Order 2nd  29.311*** -0.009*** -0.393*** 1.616*** 
 (1.303) (0.000) (0.005) (0.031) 
Birth Order 3+ 58.546*** -0.010*** -0.398*** 2.374*** 
 (2.364) (0.001) (0.007) (0.058) 
Married 30.891*** -0.013*** 0.108*** 0.593*** 
 (5.298) (0.003) (0.017) (0.130) 
Mother employed 5.853*** -0.000 -0.004 0.154*** 
 (1.154) (0.000) (0.003) (0.028) 
     
94 
 
Table 4.4 continued     
Mother’s Age 20-29 67.529*** -0.007* 0.066** 1.573*** 
 (7.629) (0.004) (0.030) (0.185) 
Mother’s Age 30-39 65.354*** -0.001 -0.015 1.667*** 
 (7.666) (0.004) (0.030) (0.189) 
Mother’s Age 40+ 24.510*** 0.018*** -0.266*** 1.112*** 
 (8.434) (0.005) (0.033) (0.211) 
Mother HS 44.841*** -0.011*** 0.051*** 1.060*** 
 (4.159) (0.002) (0.013) (0.099) 
Mother College 50.269*** -0.016*** 0.113*** 1.083*** 
 (4.305) (0.002) (0.014) (0.103) 
Father employed 10.143*** -0.005*** 0.008 0.265*** 
 (2.010) (0.001) (0.009) (0.044) 
Father’s Age 20-29 41.924*** -0.018** 0.056 1.016*** 
 (14.032) (0.009) (0.060) (0.329) 
Father’s Age 30-39 44.003*** -0.018** 0.060 1.058*** 
 (14.056) (0.009) (0.058) (0.333) 
Father’s Age 40+ 32.526** -0.011 -0.030 0.934*** 
 (13.654) (0.009) (0.059) (0.319) 
Father HS 17.139*** -0.006*** 0.013 0.405*** 
 (3.336) (0.002) (0.012) (0.079) 
Father College 23.157*** -0.010*** 0.063*** 0.466*** 
 (3.512) (0.002) (0.011) (0.085) 
N 1,082,004 1,082,004 1,082,004 1,082,004 
Notes: Outcome variables are the birth weight in grams (1), and indicator for whether the birth weight is 
less than 2,500 grams (2), gestational age in weeks (3), and ratio of birth weight to gestational age in grams 
per week (4). Regressions include indicators for cities and years. Standard errors reported in parentheses 
are clustered at the city level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Average Temperature and Average Precipitation measure the weather conditions mothers were exposed to 
during their pregnancy.  
 
If pregnant mothers take preventive action against worse air quality (for example, by 
wearing protective masks and staying indoors) when an advisory or a warning is issued, then they 
are also less likely to catch an infectious disease such as the flu that harms the fetus. Therefore, 
during an outbreak of a disease, the effect of notifications on infant health should be amplified. 
Alternatively, the detrimental effect of diseases should be offset when a notification is issued. To 
test this hypothesis, as an extension, I estimate a specification depicted below: 
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(4.2)  𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ = 𝛾𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 + 𝛼𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 × 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 + 𝛽𝑃𝑀10 + 𝜌𝑋 + 𝜖  
where Disease is a measure of how spread-out a disease is during a mother’s pregnancy. I consider 
the flu since this disease is very common and harmful to the fetus, if caught by the pregnant mother 
(Rasmussen, Jamieson and Uyeki 2012).  
I do not have data on the actual flu infection rate in Korea. Instead, I use Google Trends’ 
monthly index for keywords “flu” and “influenza”. Google Trends’ monthly index ranges between 
0 and 100, and it is based on the number of searches of keywords in the Google search engine. The 
month with the highest number of searches of a specific keyword is assigned a 100. The other 
index values are determined based on the ratio of the number of searches in a month to that in the 
month with highest number of searches. For example, if the number of a keyword’s searches in a 
month, say January 2000, is 10% of the number of searches of that keyword in the highest month, 
say July 2010, then the index value of January 2000 is 10. 
Higher index values for keywords “influenza” and “flu” in a month implies higher actual 
incidence of the disease. This is because, an individual’s interest in searching the keywords “flu” 
or “influenza” is likely to rise when they or other people they know are infected. Thus, during an 
outbreak of flu, keywords about flu are searched for more times in the internet. Put differently, 
during the actual flu outbreaks, Google Trends’ index values must be higher. Cho et al. (2013) 
reports that Google Trends indices are highly correlated with the infection rate using flu 
surveillance data in Korea between years 2007 and 2012. Using the Google Trend’s indices for 
keywords “flu” and “influenza”, I constructed variables Influenza and Flu. These variables are the 
average of the index values of the corresponding keyword during the mothers’ pregnancy, and I 
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use them as proxies for flu infection rates during the mother’s pregnancy. Larger values of Flu and 
Influenza indicate a greater risk for the mother to catch the flu during her pregnancy.81 
Results obtained from estimating Equation (4.2) over the sample of infants born between 
2007 and 2011 are presented in Table 4.5.82  In the regressions, I include all control variables 
employed in Equation (4.1). The effect of advisories and warnings on birth outcomes is positive  
Table 4.5 The effect of notifications on infant health during flu outbreaks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Birth Weight Low Birth Weight Birth Weight Low Birth 
Weight 
Advisories 7.606*** -0.004*** 11.332*** -0.005*** 
 (1.403) (0.001) (1.334) (0.001) 
Warnings 8.947*** -0.005*** 12.478*** -0.007*** 
 (2.292) (0.001) (2.080) (0.001) 
PM10 -1.782*** 0.001*** -1.677*** 0.001*** 
 (0.298) (0.000) (0.293) (0.000) 
Influenza -0.243** 0.000**   
 (0.121) (0.000)   
Advisories× Influenza 0.443*** -0.000***   
 (0.100) (0.000)   
Warnings × Influenza 0.384*** -0.000***   
 (0.085) (0.000)   
Flu   -0.092 0.000 
   (0.098) (0.000) 
Advisories× Flu   0.428*** -0.000*** 
   (0.084) (0.000) 
Warnings × Flu   0.393*** -0.000*** 
   (0.070) (0.000) 
N 724,520 724,520 724,520 724,520 
Notes: Outcome variables are the birth weight in grams (1), and indicator for whether the birth weight is 
less than 2,500 grams (2). Regressions include indicators for cities and years. Standard errors reported in 
parentheses are clustered at the city level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. In addition to the variables listed, all control variables are included in the regressions. Flu 
and Influenza are proxies of how spread-out the disease flu is during the mother’s pregnancy.  
                                                          
81 Markowitz, Nesson and Robinson (2010) also use similar Google Trends data for US in their paper where they 
investigate the effect of employment rates on flu incidence. They report that Google Trends data tracks the actual flu 
surveillance very well. 
82 I consider only this subsample of infants because the analysis of Cho et al. (2013) indicates a strong correlation 
between the Google Trends indices and the actual surveillance data during this period (2007-2011). In addition, 
internet use has become more wide-spread in Korea in late 2000s. 
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significant. Coefficients of Influenza and Flu are negative (though only the former is statistically 
significant). This implies mothers who had greater risk of catching flu during their pregnancy gave 
birth to babies with lower birth weights. The interactions of Advisories and Warnings with proxies 
of the extent of flu outbreaks during a mother’s pregnancy are positive and significant for 
birthweight. In other words, the detrimental effect of flu on newborn’s health is diminished when 
the mother experiences an advisory or a warning. This could be an evidence for an unintended 
consequence of advisories and warnings. Taking protective action against high PM10 levels such 
as wearing masks or staying indoors also protects mothers against infectious diseases such as the 
flu. They become less likely to catch a disease, and as a result, their babies are born healthier. 
My results show that each dust notification increases an infant’s weight at birth by about 
0.3% (10 grams from the baseline of 3,200 grams). Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2007) reports 
that a one percent rise in birth weight increases future earnings by about 0.13%. Therefore, one 
warning’s effect on the future earnings of a newborn is about 0.04%. Assuming the average 
newborn will earn as much as the per capita income in Korea (about $25,000), the effect of each 
dust warning is $10 per year for each new born for the rest of their lives.83  Assuming that 
individuals start working at age 25 and retire at age 60 (the minimum official retirement age in 
Korea), the present value of the stream of $10 annually is about $36 at interest rate 6% (the average 
lending rate in Korea). If the life time earnings of all 470,000 babies born in 2010 increase by $36, 
the total benefit to Koreans of a dust notification is about $17 million. Despite their benefits for 
the infants, dust notifications may be costly to the Korean mothers. For example, if a pregnant 
woman skips work due to a dust notification, she suffers a loss of income. Assuming each mother 
earns as much as the average income in Korea, $25,000 per year, the loss of a day’s income due 
                                                          
83 Korea’s per capita GDP was $22,151 in 2010. 
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to a dust notification is about $100. In my sample 28% of the mothers are employed. If all working 
mothers skip a day of work due to dust notifications, the total loss of income will be about $13 
million. Thus, the benefit of a dust notification in excess of its cost is about $4 million.  
4.5 Conclusion 
Previous papers have demonstrated that infant health, particularly weight at birth, is an 
important predictor of future outcomes. In this paper, using a data set composed of about 1.5 
million infants born between 2003 and 2011 in Korea, I investigate the impact of air quality 
warnings on birth weight. Air quality in Korea is affected by yellow dust outbreaks, naturally-
formed dust storms blown from China and Mongolia to Korea. Specifically, these storms increase 
the PM10 concentrations in the air. As a measure against yellow sand outbreaks, Korean 
Meteorological Administration watches PM10 levels and issues notifications when PM10 levels 
rise above certain thresholds. These notifications advise individuals to take preventive action by 
avoiding outdoor activities. Controlling for the air quality mothers are exposed to during their 
pregnancy (average PM10 concentration), I find a positive and statistically significant effect of 
dust notifications on birth outcomes. Specifically, each additional warning increases birth weight 
by about 10 grams from a baseline of 3,200 grams.  
My finding could be indicative of two mechanisms. First, when warnings are issued, if 
pregnant women avoid outdoors, they are less likely to be exposed to harmful particles in the air. 
This will result in a smaller amount of harmful pollutants to be transmitted to the fetus. Thus, 
babies of mothers who experienced more warnings are less likely to have low birth weight. The 
second mechanism could be an unintended consequence of warnings. The preventive actions 
(staying indoors, and wearing protective masks) undertaken by the pregnant women and the public 
in general could reduce the spread of infectious diseases such as the flue. Since a mother who 
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experienced warnings is less likely to be infected by diseases, their babies will have better birth 
outcomes. I provide evidence that PM10 warnings reduce the negative impact of flu outbreaks on 
infant health. 
Back of the envelope calculations suggest that dust notifications are economically 
beneficial to Korea. Each additional dust notification increases future earnings of an average 
Korean infant by $10 annually for the rest of their lives. Present value of such a 35-year annuity is 
about $36 per infant, or about $17 million for all 470,000 infants born in 2010. Because of a dust 
warning, mothers may skip work and consequently suffer an income loss of $100 per day. Since 
28% of the 470,000 mothers are employed, the total productivity loss due to a dust notification is 
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APPENDIX A: 18 QUESTIONS RELATED TO FOOD INSECURITY 
FROM THE FOOD SECURITY SUPPLEMENTS OF THE CPS 
1. “We worried whether our food would run out before we got money to buy more.” Was that 
often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months?  
2. “The food that we bought just didn’t last and we didn’t have money to get more.” Was that 
often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months?  
3. “We couldn’t afford to eat balanced meals.” Was that often, sometimes, or never true for you in 
the last 12 months?  
4. In the last 12 months, did you or other adults in the household ever cut the size of your meals or 
skip meals because there wasn’t enough money for food? (Yes/No)  
5. (If yes to question 4) How often did this happen—almost every month, some months but not 
every month, or in only 1 or 2 months?  
6. In the last 12 months, did you ever eat less than you felt you should because there wasn’t enough 
money for food? (Yes/No)  
7. In the last 12 months, were you ever hungry, but didn’t eat, because there wasn’t enough money 
for food? (Yes/No)  
8. In the last 12 months, did you lose weight because there wasn’t enough money for food? 
(Yes/No)  
9. In the last 12 months did you or other adults in your household ever not eat for a whole day 
because there wasn’t enough money for food? (Yes/No)  
10. (If yes to question 9) How often did this happen—almost every month, some months but not 
every month, or in only 1 or 2 months?  
(Questions 11-18 were asked only if the household included children age 0-17)  
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11. “We relied on only a few kinds of low-cost food to feed our children because we were running 
out of money to buy food.” Was that often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months?  
12. “We couldn’t feed our children a balanced meal, because we couldn’t afford that.” Was that 
often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months?  
13. “The children were not eating enough because we just couldn’t afford enough food.” Was that 
often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months?  
14. In the last 12 months, did you ever cut the size of any of the children’s meals because there 
wasn’t enough money for food? (Yes/No)  
15. In the last 12 months, were the children ever hungry but you just couldn’t afford more food? 
(Yes/No)  
16. In the last 12 months, did any of the children ever skip a meal because there wasn’t enough 
money for food? (Yes/No)  
17. (If yes to question 16) How often did this happen—almost every month, some months but not 
every month, or in only 1 or 2 months?  
18. In the last 12 months did any of the children ever not eat for a whole day because there 
wasn’t enough money for food? (Yes/No) 











APPENDIX B: HOW IS MSA-LEVEL MATCH TO UA-LEVEL DATA? 
Households’ home locations are available at the MSA level, whereas public transportation 
data are available at the UA level. Therefore, it is necessary to match those two of different 
geographic levels. The Census 2000 classifies an MSA and a UA using the population of areas. 
An MSA is defined as an area which has “at least one urbanized area of 50,000 or more inhabitants,” 
whereas a UA consists of “core census block groups or blocks that have a population density of at 
least 1,000 people per square mile.” Therefore, I compare the population of counties that 
commonly belong to an MSA and a UA.  
Both MSA and UA have an “area name” which consists of principle cities and a state name 
according to the Census Bureau. There are three cases for which an MSA and a UA are treated to 
be equivalent.84 First, although state name is the same in both regional areas, sometimes the 
remaining part of the name (area name) could be different between an MSA and a UA. In this case, 
if an MSA and a UA share the same name for one or more principle cities, I treat them to be equal. 
For example, let’s consider an MSA named “Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA” and a UA 
named “Atlanta, GA”. “Sandy Springs” and “Marietta” are the cities that belong respectively to 
Fulton and Cobb counties, and both of them commonly belong to the MSA and the UA. Hence, 
these MSA and UA are treated to be equivalent, although the names are not perfectly the same. 
Second, an MSA and a UA may have exactly the same “area name,” but they may have slightly 
different state name. An example is “El Paso, TX” for an MSA and “El Paso, TX-NM” for a UA. 
Third, an MSA and a UA have a similar area name and similar state name: “New York-Northern 
                                                          
84 Based on name comparison, there is one more case in which two UAs occupy an MSA: an example is an MSA 
“Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX,” and two UAs, “Beaumont, TX” and “Port Arthur, TX.” However, these 9 MSAs are 
eventually not in my final sample. 
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New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA,” for an MSA and “New York-Newark, NY-NJ-CT” for a 
UA. In the second and third cases, I also treat two corresponding MSA and UA to be equivalent. 
An MSA consists of one or more whole counties, whereas a UA may consist of portions of 
counties. Therefore, in the second step, I calculate the population in 2000 in overlapped areas 
between an MSA and a UA. The population of county portions in a UA is obtained from the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency “which calculates population for each portion of either an 
incorporated place or a county within a UA based on the population values provided by the 2000 
US Census Tiger data.” Consider an MSA, “Reno-Sparks, NV” and a UA, “Reno, NV.”  The MSA 
consists of two counties, Washoe and Storey, whose populations are 339,486 and 3,399 
respectively. On the other hand, the UA consists of a portion of Washoe county with 303,689 
residents in 2000. Since Washoe county commonly belongs to the MSA and the UA, the population 
over the overlapped area is 303,689.  
Third, I calculate the population share of areas that simultaneously belong to an MSA and 
a UA, or the population ratio between the common area and the united areas of an MSA and a UA. 
Then, I only keep areas if the population share of overlapped areas to the united areas of an MSA 
and a UA is greater than or equal to 80%. Hence, in the final sample, when an individual is 
randomly selected in a certain MSA or a UA, the probability for the person to live in the common 
area of an MSA and a UA is at least 80%. In the above example, “Reno-Sparks, NV,” the MSA 
and “Reno, NV” the UA are selected as a matched area in the final sample since their population 
ratio is about 89 percent. Through this procedure, 45 matched areas are selected, but 40 out of 45 
remain in the final dataset due to the availability of transportation data.   
Appendix Figure A.1 presents four matched area examples out of the final 40 local areas, 
and belong to South, Midwest, South, and Northeast, respectively. Gray areas indicate an MSA 
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area, while black regions are a UA. In Appendix Figure A.1.,A., whole areas of the UA named 
“Atlanta, GA” is contained in the MSA named “Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA.” In 
Appendix Figure A.1.,B., the UA, “El Paso, TX-NM,” belongs to Texas and New Mexico at the 
same time, while the MSA “El Paso, TX” is contained only in Texas. As observed, there is little 
area outside of the MSA “El Paso, TX”, “Dona Ana” county which belongs to state New Mexico 
and the population is 26,336. The population of county portion “Dona Ana” within the UA is 3.7 
percent to the population of the united areas of an MSA and a UA, meaning that the population in  
                         
A.     B. 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA  Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI 
 
 
              
C.     D. 
                        El Paso, TX     New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA 
 




this area is negligible.85 Similarly, there are portions of counties (Fairfield in Connecticut, Mercer 
and Warren in New Jersey, Dutchess and Orange in New York) belonging to a UA, but not to an 
MSA “New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA.” The population of those areas 
is about 60,000 and occupies less than 0.5 percent of the united areas of the UA and the MSA of 
“New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA.”     
As shown in exemplary maps, the whole area of a UA sometimes is not completely 
contained in an MSA. However, I compare the population of common counties in an MSA and a 
UA, and pick up the matched areas whose common areas between an MSA and a UA have at least 
80 percent of the combined population. It implies that the population density of an MSA is high in 
a UA where public transportation system is concentrated. Although an MSA and a UA seem 
geographically different, in my final dataset the majority of people, at least 80 percent, reside in 











                                                          




APPENDIX C: SIPP DATA DETAILS 
The sample in each SIPP panel randomly but equally breaks down into four rotation groups, and 
each rotation group started interviewing at a different time in each following month. Each rotation 
group is mutually exclusive and the composition does not change over time within the same panel. 
For example, in the 2001 panel, rotation group-1 had a survey every month from October 2000 
through September 2003, while rotation group-4 began in January 2001 and ended in December 
2003. The 2001 panel consists of nine waves, where one wave is composed of four monthly 
interview responses from household members about demographics, labor force participation, and 
government program participation.  
Households were first interviewed about financial assets and debts of a household in the third wave 
in 2001. The same questions were asked again during the sixth and the ninth waves of the survey 
in 2002 and 2003. This allows up to trace the changes in assets and liabilities for the households 
in each rotation group between 2001, 2002, and 2003. Since the month of the SIPP interview is 
known, we match the implementation of the month to the SIPP. This SIPP sample design enables 
us to employ the monthly level Food Stamp vehicle exemption rules across states in a panel format. 









APPENDIX D: TABLES 
Table D.1 A list of 40 metropolitan statistical areas in my sample matched to urbanized areas 
Metropolitan Statistical Area Region Metropolitan Statistical Area Region 
Albuquerque, NM West Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, 
  WI 
Midwest 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs- 
  Marietta, GA 
South Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, 
  MN-WI 
Midwest 
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy,   
  MA-NH 
Northeast New York-Northern New Jersey- 
  Long Island, NY-NJ-PA 
Northeast 
Bradenton-Sarasota-Venice, FL South Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA Midwest 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY Northeast Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL South 
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet,  
  IL-IN-WI 
Midwest Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington,  
  PA-NJ-DE-MD 
Northeast 
Colorado Springs, CO West Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ West 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, 
  TX 
South Port St. Lucie, FL South 
Denver-Aurora-Broomfield, CO West Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton,  
  OR-WA 
West 
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI Midwest Reno-Sparks, NV West 
El Paso, TX South Rockford, IL Midwest 
Flint, MI Midwest Salt Lake City, UT West 
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO West San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos,  
  CA 
West 
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown,  
  TX 
South San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara,  
  CA 
West 
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV West Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA West 
Los Angeles-Long Beach- 
  Santa Ana, CA 
West Spokane, WA West 
Lubbock, TX South Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, 
  FL 
South 
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission,  
  TX 
South Tucson, AZ West 
Memphis, TN-MS-AR South Virginia Beach-Norfolk- 
  Newport News, VA 
South 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale- 
  Pompano Beach, FL 
South Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, 








Table D.2 The impact of public transportation accessibility on food insecurity,  
independent variable: the number of bus-equivalent vehicles per 10,000 people  
by using cutoff = 2: food insecurity = 1, otherwise 0 
 All households Poor households Non-poor households 
 IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Local variable       
  Unemployment  0.004 0.005 0.010 0.010 -0.001 0.000 
    rate (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.004) (0.003) 
  Population 0.017** -0.002 0.015 0.008 0.018 -0.006 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.013) (0.008) (0.012) (0.006) 
State variables       
  Welfare  0.034 0.044 0.077 0.080 -0.016 -0.001 
    expenditures (0.052) (0.052) (0.119) (0.125) (0.041) (0.041) 
  Food stamp  -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 
    participation rate   (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Household variables      
  Poor 0.074*** 0.074***     
 (0.009) (0.009)     
  FSP beneficiary 0.252*** 0.252*** 0.217*** 0.217*** 0.488*** 0.489*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.030) (0.031) 







    individuals (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) 








 (0.005) (0.006) (0.013) (0.014) (0.004) (0.004) 
  No. of children 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
  Single Female- 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.013 0.013 0.072*** 0.073*** 
    headed HH (0.012) (0.012) (0.026) (0.026) (0.022) (0.022) 








 (0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.017) (0.010) (0.010) 
  High income -
0.087*** 
-0.088*** -0.168 -0.169 -0.075*** -
0.077*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.120) (0.121) (0.010) (0.011) 








 (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009) 
Household head variables      





 (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) 
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Table D.2 continued      
  Less than college -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.026 -0.026 -0.041*** -0.041*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.020) (0.020) (0.015) (0.015) 






 (0.012) (0.012) (0.021) (0.022) (0.015) (0.015) 
  Black 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) 
  Other race -0.003 -0.004 -0.013 -0.014 0.003 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.025) (0.026) (0.006) (0.006) 
  Hispanic 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.024*** 0.021*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) 
  Female 0.008** 0.008** 0.015 0.015 0.007** 0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) 
  Married -0.003 -0.003 0.010 0.010 -0.014** -0.014** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) 
  30-39 year old 0.019** 0.018** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.002 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) 
  40-49 year old 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.007 0.007 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.018) (0.018) (0.007) (0.007) 
  50-59 year old 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.004 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.019) (0.020) (0.006) (0.006) 
  60 year old and 
older 
-0.019* -0.019* -0.028 -0.029 -0.016** -0.016** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.033) (0.033) (0.007) (0.008) 
N 28,304 28,304 8,418 8,418 19,886 19,886 
Notes: A cutoff is the assigned number of affirmative responses to 18 food insecurity questions. A 
dichotomous indicator of food insecurity equals one if a household gives to the questionnaire more 
affirmative responses than the cutoff. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level in parentheses. 
* signifies statistical significance at the 10% level; ** at 5% level, and *** at the 1% level or less. The 
CPS-FSS sampling weights are used in each regression. All regressions contain other local, state, 












Table D.3 State-level vehicle asset rule for the SNAP eligibility  
for states not included in my estimation sample 
State 
After policy change 
Effective date Vehicle exemption 
Alaska 2001 Sep Exempt One vehicle 
Delaware 2000 Feb Exempt All vehicles 
Hawaii 2002 Sep Exempt All vehicles 
Maine 2000 Sep Exempt All vehicles 
Maryland 2001 Mar Exempt All vehicles 
Massachusetts 2001 Sep Exempt All vehicles 
Michigan 2000 Oct Exempt All vehicles 
North Dakota 2000 Oct Exempt All vehicles 
Oregon 2000 Dec Exempt All vehicles 
South Carolina 2001 Apr Exempt All vehicles 
South Dakota 2001 Sep Exempt One vehicle 
Texas 2001 Sep More than federal SNAP rule 
Vermont 2001 Sep Exempt One vehicle 
Wyoming 2001 Sep More than federal SNAP rule 
Notes: Source: SNAP State Policy Database, United States Department of Agriculture 
Connecticut is not listed above because vehicle asset rule for SNAP eligibility changed multiple times. 
Specifically, one vehicle was exempted until 2001 August, then exemption rule was dropped, and then 
















Table D.4 Summary statistics for low educated single parents from 11-state sample used for 
household fixed effects specifications, conditional on owning a car before the policy change 
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State-Level Characteristics    




































    
State-Level SNAP Policy Rules   












    
N 233 125 108 
Notes:  Data are from SIPP panels: Wave 3 in 2001, Wave 6 in 2002, and Wave 9 in 2003. Vehicles 
include cars, vans and trucks, but exclude recreational vehicles (RVs) and motorcycles.  Values of each 
vehicle are aggregated if a household owns multiple cars. Liquid assets contain dollar amounts in 
checking and saving accounts, bonds/securities, stocks, and other financial investments. Non-housing 
wealth includes liquid assets, IRA accounts, business equity, and vehicle equity. Dollar values are in 
2005 dollars. Car ownership is not 100 percent before the policy change because there are 13 
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